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Abstract
We analyze a labor search model in which workers choose their search intensity by
deciding how often and where to apply for jobs. They observe ﬁrms’ wage postings prior
to their decision. Due to coordination frictions a ﬁrm may not receive any applications;
otherwise it is able to hire unless all its applicants have better oﬀers. We show that in
equilibrium the entry of ﬁrms, the search intensity and the number of ﬁlled vacancies
are constrained eﬃcient. Wage dispersion creates an (endogenous) safety net against un-
employment that is essential for eﬃciency. As application costs vanish the equilibrium
becomes unconstrained eﬃcient.
Keywords (JEL codes): simultaneous search, directed search, eﬃcient wage dispersion, modiﬁed
Hosios condition, search with stable matchings (J64, C78, D85)
1 Introduction
Search models of the labor market are fraught with externalities. For instance, a new ﬁrm that
enters the market creates positive externalities for the workers who now have an easier time ﬁnding
∗This paper circulated under the title “Eﬃciency of Simultaneous Directed Search with Recall”. The idea
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Jan Eeckhout, Stephan Lauermann, Wolfram Merzyn, Georg N¨ oldeke, Andrew Postlewaite and Randy Wright
for many helpful discussions. This paper beneﬁtted from the input of seminar participants at a number of
conferences.
†University of Pennsylvania. e-mail: kircher@econ.upenn.edu.a job, and creates negative externalities for other ﬁrms that now have a more diﬃcult time hiring.
In random search models in which ﬁrms meet workers by chance, this externality is in general not
internalized and ineﬃciencies prevail (see Hosios (1990)). This changes in directed search models in
which ﬁrms compete for labor through public wage announcements and workers subsequently apply
for jobs. Despite the frictions in the decentralized application process, the equilibrium price for labor
internalizes the market’s externalities and delivers a constrained eﬃcient outcome (see e.g. Hosios
(1990), Montgomery (1991), Moen (1997), Shimer (1996, 2005), Acemo˘ glu and Shimer (1999), Shi
(2001, 2002) and Mortensen and Wright (2002)).
The directed search literature has focused mainly on the one-sided externality of entry of ﬁrms.1
There is no “entry” dimension for workers, since by assumption the number of unemployed workers
is ﬁxed and each worker is only allowed to send a single application. Yet frictions in the application
process leave some of them unemployed. This induces an incentive for the workers to apply for several
jobs in order to increase their employment prospects. This naturally introduces search intensity into
the model and acts like an entry externality, but on the workers’ side of the market: If a worker sends
a second application, he creates negative externalities for the other workers who might ﬁnd it harder
to get a job and positive externalities for the ﬁrms who have an easier time hiring. This raises the
question if a single instrument – the wage – can internalize this additional externality.
Recent contributions provide a negative answer. Work by Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2006)
and Galenianos and Kircher (2006) shows that the equilibrium interaction is ineﬃcient when workers
apply to more than one job. This suggests an eﬃciency role for labor market interventions, and ques-
tions the robustness of the eﬃciency results obtained in the earlier literature.2 However, both papers,
while relaxing the restriction to a single application, impose another strong assumption. They restrict
ﬁrms to contact only one of their applicants. If that applicant rejects the oﬀer, the ﬁrms remains
vacant even if several other workers applied for the job. This restriction exacerbates the negative
externality of a second application: the application might “block” other workers from obtaining a
job even if the applicant decides not to accept the job oﬀer. It remains an open question whether
the ineﬃciencies are mainly due to this additional restriction, or whether they are a deeper feature
induced by the two-sided externality.
This paper investigates the eﬃciency of the market interaction once ﬁrms can contact all their
applicants. We propose a theory of market interaction based on the idea that communication leads to
a stable matching among the ﬁrms and their applicants. Stability means that a ﬁrm does not remain
1Some analyses such as Shi (2002) and Shimer (2005) also consider the sorting of workers to ﬁrms in a
model with heterogeneities. A sorting component that we term search eﬃciency is also important in our setting
despite homogeneity of agents, because multiple applications lead to endogenous sorting by risk levels.
2A minimum wage improves eﬃciency in Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2006). In Galenianos and Kircher
(2006) a uniform government-mandated wage or interventions that reduce workers’ tendency to apply for high-
wage jobs can reduce negative eﬀects associated with wage dispersion.
2vacant while one of its applicants starts to work at a lower wage or remains unemployed.3 If this
would happen, both the ﬁrm and the worker would be better oﬀ by deviating and forming a match
amongst themselves. Stability arises naturally if ﬁrms oﬀer their job sequentially to applicants, and
workers are free to reconsider their options. In such a process a high wage ﬁrm will entice a worker
away from lower wage competitors, and a ﬁrm remains vacant only if all its oﬀers get rejected in favor
of better alternatives.4 In our setup a ﬁrm can only communicate with those workers that applied to
the ﬁrm, and therefore our model naturally diﬀers from the usual stability analysis that presume that
all agents in the economy communicate with one-another.
Our main result is that eﬃciency re-emerges as the equilibrium outcome in our setting. For
given market frictions the equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient along the following operative margins.
Entry Eﬃciency: the constrained optimal number of ﬁrms enter. Eﬃciency of Search Intensity: the
number of applications that workers send is constrained eﬃcient. Search Eﬃciency: workers send
their applications in a way that induces the optimal number of matches. Thus, even when workers can
intensify their search eﬀorts by strategically choosing a set of ﬁrms to which they apply, market wages
are such that workers take the socially optimal application decisions and ﬁrms provide the socially
optimal number of jobs. Neither interventions that incentivize workers’ job search or subsidize ﬁrms’
entry or wage setting are warranted on eﬃciency grounds within this model.
The analysis of the eﬃciency properties of our model reveals two additional insights: First, wage
dispersion is crucial to achieve constrained eﬃciency when workers apply to more than one job – even
though workers and ﬁrms are homogeneous and risk neutral. Low wage jobs endogenously create a
safety net that provide relatively good hiring prospects for workers who happen to be unsuccessful
with their applications to high wage ﬁrms. We show that at a single market wage the absence of such
a safety net would lead to ineﬃciencies. The presence of multiple wage segments provides the right
incentives for workers to apply optimally. Eﬃcient entry of ﬁrms arises because each wage segment is
governed by a modiﬁed version of Hosios’ (1990) condition for optimal entry of ﬁrms. The idea that
matching frictions induce wage dispersion even in settings where workers and ﬁrms are homogeneous
has been pursued in a large body of work (see e.g. Acemo˘ glu and Shimer (2000); Albrecht, Gautier and
Vroman (2006); Burdett and Judd (1983); Burdett and Mortensen (1998); Butters (1977); Delacroix
and Shi (2005); Galenianos and Kircher (2006); Gaumont, Schindler and Wright (2006); Mortensen
(2003)), yet the insight that wage dispersion might arise as the optimal response of the market to deal
with the matching frictions in such a setting is as far as we know new to the literature.
Second, the paper also adds to the literature on asymptotic eﬃciency of search markets. We
3We treat wages as ﬁxed in the matching stage. The implications and the applicability of this assumption
is discussed in section 4.4. This notion of stability has been successfully applied in many areas; see recently
Burlow and Levin (2006) who also deploy matching at ﬁxed wages after non-cooperative wage setting stage but
assume that all workers apply to all ﬁrms.
4Such a sequential process is known as Deferred Acceptance Process pioneered by Gale and Shapley (1962).
For ﬁnite economies it converges in ﬁnite time; in our continuum economy we impose stability by assumption.
3show that for vanishing application costs the equilibrium converges to the unconstrained eﬃcient
outcome of a frictionless Walrasian economy. Such convergence results are novel for environments
with simultaneous (job) search. Asymptotic eﬃciency has been established in sequential search e.g. in
Gale (1987). For an overview and quite general speciﬁcations see Lauermann (2006). In simultaneous
search, Acemo˘ glu and Shimer (2000) and Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2006) present limit results,
yet converge to some constrained eﬃcient outcome where frictions are still present on the other market
side.
To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst attempt to integrate the two-sided strategic considerations of
a search environment with stability concepts used in matching markets.5 The paper draws on three
strands of literature. We use insights from the directed search literature (e.g. Peters (1984, 1991),
Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001)) to model the frictions and information ﬂows in the market. With
multiple applications workers face a simultaneous portfolio choice. For this type of problem Chade and
Smith (2006) consider an individual agent’s choice and derive a simple characterization of the optimal
decision rule; Galenianos and Kircher (2006) derive implications in an equilibrium search framework.
For the ﬁnal matching we apply the stability concept pioneered by Gale and Shapley (1962) to the
network that formed in the search process.
Since notation and exposition remain much more tractable when we consider at most two appli-
cations per worker, Sections 2 to 4 are restricted to this case. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
characterizes the equilibrium. Section 4 establishes constrained eﬃciency. In this section we also high-
light the role of wage dispersion in achieving eﬃciency, relate our results to the literature, and discuss
the assumptions that lead to eﬃciency in our model. Section 5 lifts the restriction to two applications
per worker and, additionally, discusses convergence for vanishing application costs. Omitted proofs
are gathered in the appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Environment and Strategies
The economy consists of a continuum of unemployed workers and a continuum of vacant ﬁrms. The
ratio of workers to ﬁrms, denoted v, is determined by free entry of ﬁrms.6 Each ﬁrm has a single
vacancy. If it ﬁlls its vacancy, it produces one unit of output. All agents are risk neutral. Firms
maximize expected output minus wage and entry costs. Workers maximize expected wage payments
minus costs of applying for jobs.
The market interaction proceeds in three stages. First, ﬁrms decide whether to enter the market
5Gautier and Moraga-Gonz´ alez (2005) present a 3-player example with a similar concept for random search.
6Due to constant returns to scale in matching it turns out that only this ratio of workers to ﬁrms matters in
our analysis.
4by posting a wage that they commit to pay when they hire a worker. A ﬁrm that enters incurs cost
K < 1 of setting up the job and advertising it to workers. Next, workers observe all wage postings.
Each worker decides on the number i of applications he wants to send at cost c(i), which subsumes
monetary as well as time and eﬀort costs. A worker who does not send applications does not incur any
costs. The marginal costs ci = c(i) − c(i − 1) are assumed to be weakly increasing. The worker also
decides on the i active ﬁrms to which he applies. For now we restrict attention to i ≤ 2 applications
per worker in order to present the basic ideas in the simplest possible context; later we generalize our
setup to i ≤ N applications. After the applications are sent out they form the links in a network
between workers and ﬁrms: each worker is linked to the ﬁrms to which he applied and each ﬁrm is
linked to its applicants. In the ﬁnal stage workers and ﬁrms form matches, the announced wage is
paid and matched pairs start production.
The matching is assumed to be stable on the network, i.e. matches form such that no ﬁrm remains
vacant while one of its applicants either remains unmatched or is matched to another ﬁrm at a lower
wage. This is motivated by the fact that otherwise both could deviate and be jointly better oﬀ. Our
stability notion presumes that ﬁrms cannot react to other ﬁrms’ oﬀers and are committed to their
wage announcement at this ﬁnal stage - an assumption that we discuss in detail when we point out
the forces leading to eﬃciency in Section 4.4.
The market is large and anonymous. To capture this in the spirit of the directed search literature we
consider equilibrium strategies that are symmetric and anonymous. This implies that ﬁrms use hiring
strategies that do not condition on the identity of the worker. All workers use the same application
strategies, and do not condition on the ﬁrms’ identities. These assumptions create the frictions in the
market: the use of identical and anonymous strategies by the workers implies that they sometimes
miscoordinate in the sense that several of them apply for the same job that only one of them can get.
This arises even when there are fewer workers than ﬁrms. Since workers’ strategies usually involve
some degree of randomization over jobs, they can only anticipate which jobs are more likely to have
many applicants but they cannot predict the exact realizations of applications at each vacancy and
therefore they cannot target those vacancies that in the end remain vacant.
A pure strategy for an active ﬁrm is a wage oﬀer w ∈ [0,1]. Let F denote the wage distribution
and F its support. That is, F(w) gives the proportion of ﬁrms that oﬀer wages below w. A worker
observes the distribution of posted wages and then decides on the number of applications that he
wants to send. He also decides on the ﬁrm to which he wants to apply. Given our focus on anonymous
strategies, a worker applies with equal probability to all ﬁrms with the same wage.7 Therefore we
can summarize his choice of ﬁrm by the wage to which he applies. A mixed strategy for a worker is
then given by the tuples γ = (γ0,γ1,γ2) and G = (G1,G2), where γi is the probability of sending i
7This is optimal if all other workers also follow anonymous strategies. At the expense of substantial additional
notation one can show that symmetry rather than anonymity of the workers’ strategy is suﬃcient to yield
identical hiring probabilities to ﬁrms with the same wage.
5applications. G1(w) gives the probability that the worker sends his application to a wage below w if
he sends one application. G2(w1,w2) gives the probability that the worker applies to a wage below w1
with the ﬁrst and below w2 with the second application when he sends out two applications, where we
assume w2 ≥ w1 throughout. In our large economy these probabilities also reﬂect the fraction of the
population that undertake a given action due our assumption that workers use symmetric strategies.
2.2 Expected Payoﬀs and Equilibrium Deﬁnition
To describe the expected payoﬀs, let η(w) denote the probability that a ﬁrm that posts wage w hires
a worker. Let p(w) be the probability that an applicant at wage w receives an oﬀer given that he does
not obtain a job at a higher wage. These probabilities depend on the strategies, as we describe below.
The expected proﬁt of a ﬁrm posting wage w - omitting entry costs - is
π(w) = η(w)(1 − w). (1)
The proﬁts comprise the hiring probability multiplied by the proﬁt margin if a worker is hired.
The utility of a worker who sends no application is U0 = 0. A worker who applies with one
application to wage w obtains utility
U1(w) = p(w)w − c(1); (2)
i.e., the expected wage minus the cost of the application. A worker who applies to wages (w1,w2)
with w2 ≥ w1 obtains utility
U2(w1,w2) = p(w2)w2 + (1 − p(w2))p(w1)w1 − c(2). (3)
The worker’s utility is given by the wage w2 if he is hired at that wage, which happens with probability
p(w2). With the complementary probability 1 − p(w2) he does not receive an oﬀer at the high wage
and his utility is w1 if he gets an oﬀer for his low wage application, which happens with probability
p(w1). He always incurs the cost for the two applications.
As in other directed search models, the endogenous probabilities p(w) and q(w) depend on the number
of applications relative to number of ﬁrms at a given wage. This ratio is called the gross queue length
because it describes the average queue of applications per job at wage w. We denote it by λ(w). The
important novelty in our setup is that a ﬁrm might not be able to hire even if it obtains an application,
because the applicant might have applied to a higher wage job and is hired there. We call applications
“eﬀective” if the applicant does not obtain a better job. Denote by ψ(w) the fraction of applications
that are not eﬀective in the sense that the applicant is unavailable for hiring due to better alternatives.
6The ratio of eﬀective applications to ﬁrms at wage w is given by
µ(w) = (1 − ψ(w))λ(w). (4)
We call µ(w) the eﬀective queue length at w.
Due to the anonymity of the workers’ strategy the eﬀective applications that are sent to ﬁrms with
wage w are uniformly distributed over the ﬁrms that oﬀer this wage. Therefore, the number of eﬀective
applications at any individual ﬁrm at this wage is random. If the number of eﬀective applications and
ﬁrms at wage w were ﬁnite, the number of eﬀective applications at a given ﬁrm would be Binomially
distributed. For our large economy where many ﬁrms oﬀer each wage in the wage distribution, we
consider the limit when the number of both eﬀective applications and ﬁrms tends to inﬁnity while
retaining a ratio of µ(w). In the limit the Binomial distribution converges to the much simpler Poisson
distribution with parameter µ(w), and the probability that a ﬁrm receives no eﬀective application is
e−µ(w). If the ﬁrm receives at least one eﬀective application it is able to ﬁll its vacancy, because once
a ﬁrm has a worker who is not employed at a better wage it won’t remain unemployed by our stability
assumption. Therefore the hiring probability for a ﬁrm is
η(w) = 1 − e−µ(w). (5)
Next, we consider the probability of getting a job at wage w for a worker who wants to obtain a job
at that wage, i.e. who is eﬀective in the sense that he did not get a better job oﬀer. The worker only
cares about those rival applicants that do not have a better oﬀer either, i.e. that are eﬀective. Given
that there are 1−e−µ(w) matches per ﬁrm and µ(w) eﬀective applications per ﬁrm, the probability of





with the convention that p(w) = 1 if µ(w) = 0.
The hiring probabilities obviously depend on the strategies of the agents in the economy, since the
eﬀective queue length depends on the ratio λ(w) of gross applications to ﬁrms and the probability
ψ(w) that a worker gets a better job. The gross queue length is in our large economy characterized
by the following condition that relates the measure of applications that workers send to the measure
8For a careful and intuitive derivation of the expressions for η(·) and p(·) as the limit of the interaction of a
ﬁnite number of agents at the same wage see Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001).






λ( ˜ w) dF( ˜ w) ∀w ∈ [0,1], (7)
where G2
1 is the marginal distribution of G2(w1,w2) with respect to w1 and G2
2 is the marginal
distribution with respect to w2. The left hand side denotes the mass of applications that are sent to
wages up to w. It is given by the probability that workers who send one application send it to wages
up to w, and the probability that workers who send two applications send either their low or their
high application up to w. These are dispersed over the ﬁrms that oﬀer wages up to wage w. The mass
of received applications is speciﬁed on the right hand side. It is given by the ratio of applications per
ﬁrm aggregated over all relevant wages, multiplied by the amount v of active ﬁrms in the market.
The probability ψ(w) that an applicant is not available for hiring because he accepts some (weakly)
better oﬀer is trivially zero if workers send only one application. Moreover, if no worker applies to
wage w then a ﬁrm cannot hire and ψ(w) is irrelevant. Otherwise, consider some application sent
to wage w in the support of the wage oﬀer distribution, and let ˆ G( ˜ w|w) denote the probability that
the sender mailed a second application and sent it to a wage weakly lower then ˜ w. Let ˆ g(w|w) be
the probability that the sender mailed another application to the same wage.10 The applicant takes
a strictly better job if he applied to a strictly higher wage and receives an oﬀer. This occurs with
probability
R 1
˜ w>w p( ˜ w)d ˆ G( ˜ w|w). The applicant takes another equally good oﬀer if he applied to it, the
other ﬁrm also wants to hire him, and the applicant chooses the other ﬁrm over this ﬁrm. One can
think about workers that apply twice to the same wage as randomizing in advance about which oﬀer
they would prefer to accept in case they get both oﬀers. Since workers do not condition their choices
on the identities of ﬁrms, both ﬁrms have equal chances of attracting the worker, and therefore an
application is not eﬀective with probability ˆ g(w|w)p(w)/2 due to oﬀers from other equally good ﬁrms.








Since the speciﬁcation allows ﬁrms to hire any worker that is not matched at higher or equally
high wages, the ﬁnal matching is stable in the sense that no ﬁrm is vacant while one of its applicants
is matched at a strictly lower wage. Due to the indiﬀerence of the ﬁrms about which worker to hire, a
stable matching is clearly not unique. Our speciﬁcation is based on the standard anonymity assump-
9We deﬁne λ(·) on R+ ∪ {∞} to account for the case that a zero measure of ﬁrms might receive a mass of
applications.
10The distribution ˆ G( ˜ w|w) depends on the equilibrium strategies as follows: There are γ1dG1(w) single
applications, γ2dG2
1(w) low applications and γ2dG2
2(w) high applications at w, adding to a total measure
T(w) = γ1dG1(w) + γ2dG2
1(w) + γ2dG2




−j( ˜ w|w), where −j ∈
{1,2}/{j}. Moreover, ˆ g( ˜ w|w) ≡ ˆ G( ˜ w|w) − lim ˆ w% ˜ w ˆ G( ˆ w|w) is the size of a possible mass point of ˆ G(·|w) at ˜ w.
8tion that ﬁrms hire one of their eﬀective applicants at random.
Given any speciﬁcation µ(.) for the eﬀective queue length, equations (1), (2), (3), (5) and (6) determine
the proﬁts and utilities at all wages. We deﬁne an equilibrium as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 (Equilibrium) An equilibrium is a tuple {v,F,γ,G} such that there exists µ(·) satis-
fying
1. Proﬁt Maximization and Free Entry:
(a) π(w) = π∗ ≡ maxw0∈[0,1] π(w0) for all w ∈ F.
(b) π∗ = K if v > 0, and π∗ ≤ K if v = 0.
2. Utility Maximization for a Given Number of Applications and Optimal Choice of the Number of
Applications:
(a) For any i ∈ {1,2}: Ui(w) = U∗
i ≡ maxw0∈[0,1]i Ui(w0) for all w ∈ suppGi.
(b) U∗
i = maxj∈{0,1,2} U∗
j if γi > 0.
3. Consistency: µ(·) is consistent with (4) - (8).
Condition 1a) speciﬁes that ﬁrms set only those wages that maximize their proﬁts. Condition 1 b)
speciﬁes a zero proﬁt condition for free entry and ensures that ﬁrms only abstain from the market if
they cannot earn positive proﬁts. Condition 2a) implies that workers who send i applications send
them optimally to the options available in the market. Condition 2b) ensures that workers send out the
optimal number of applications. Condition 3 reiterates the conditions on the eﬀective queue length.
The distinction between a) and b) allows the discussion of an exogenous number of applications and/or
exogenous number of ﬁrms using the appropriate subset of conditions.
We conclude this section with a discussion of the oﬀ-equilibrium-path restrictions that are imbedded in
our equilibrium deﬁnition. The equilibrium deﬁnition allows ﬁrms to post any wage in [0,1]. To know
the proﬁtability of a wage oﬀer, the ﬁrm needs to know the eﬀective queue length. Yet conditions (7)
for the gross queue length and (8) for the probability that applicants take better jobs are informative
only at wages that are in the support of the ﬁrms’ wage oﬀers. Oﬀ the equilibrium path, i.e. at wages
w / ∈ F that no ﬁrm oﬀers in equilibrium, ﬁrms have to form a belief about the reaction of workers.
Without any restrictions on these beliefs a multitude of equilibria can be sustained by postulating that
ﬁrms expect a zero queue length at oﬀ-equilibrium wages, i.e. expect not to be able to trade. Yet in
the subgame after the wages are announced, workers have an incentive to apply to a deviant if it oﬀers
a high enough wage. The equilibrium deﬁnition indirectly embeds a notion of subgame perfection by
9ensuring that the eﬀective queue length at out-of-equilibrium wages cannot be too low. In particular,
condition 2a) speciﬁes that at no wage (including oﬀ-equilibrium wages) the workers’ utility can be
higher than at those wages to which the workers apply on the equilibrium path. In particular this
rules out the belief that the queue length is zero at high wages, since workers would like to apply if
the queue length were indeed zero which would violate condition 2a).
A slightly more stringent concept is the Market Utility Assumption that is regularly applied in
directed search models to capture the idea of subgame perfection more precisely. It is based on the
idea that workers who can obtain the Market Utility U∗ in equilibrium would not settle for a lower
level of utility at any ﬁrm: Given some Market Utility level U∗ that workers obtain in equilibrium, the
eﬀective queue length at any wage w is such that a worker who applies to w (and possibly to the most
suitable second wage w0 ∈ F) also achieves utility U∗. If there is no queue length that achieves such
indiﬀerent, the queue length at w is zero. For wages that are oﬀered in equilibrium this is implied by
worker optimality. The Market Utility Assumption extends this to wages oﬀered by deviating ﬁrms.
We discuss the connection to subgame perfection as well as the exact mathematical formulation in the
appendix. In some derivations it will be convenient to adopt this assumption, and therefore we will
adopt it throughout. We show in the appendix that the set of equilibria is not aﬀected by imposing
this additional assumption.
3 Equilibrium Characterization
In this section we characterize the equilibrium properties of the model and show
Summary 1 An equilibrium exists. Generically the following hold: The equilibrium is unique; all
workers send the same number of applications; the number of oﬀered wages equals the number of
applications that each worker sends; each worker applies with one application to each wage.
To establish this formally, we proceed in in three subsections. First, we analyze the workers’ search
behavior for a given distribution of wages and for a given number of applications that the workers
send. For this we follow the approach in Chade and Smith (2006) and Galenianos and Kircher (2006).
Then we analyze the distribution of wages that ﬁrms post. Finally, we determine the equilibrium
number of applications.
3.1 Workers’ Search Decision
Consider a single worker who observes all wages and – in equilibrium – knows the probability of
success at each wage. Equilibrium condition 2a) implies that workers apply optimally. For a worker
who sends one application, applying to wage w0 is optimal if and only if
p(w0)w0 = u1 ≡ max
w
p(w)w. (9)
10That is, u1 is the highest expected return that a worker can generate with one application. If the
worker sends two applications, the analysis is a bit more involved. Let ¯ w be the highest wage that
delivers u1, i.e. ¯ w = sup{w ∈ [0,1]|p(w)w = u1}.
Lemma 1 The optimal choice for a worker who sends two applications involves sending one applica-
tion to a wage weakly below ¯ w and one application to a wage weakly above ¯ w.
Proof: The worker who sends two applications maximizes
max
(w1,w2)
p(w2)w2 + (1 − p(w2))p(w1)w1, (10)
where we can omit the costs of sending the applications, since they are ﬁxed for a worker who is
determined to send two applications. Note that we have set up problem (10) without the restriction
that w1 ≤ w2. Nevertheless, it is immediate that a worker who has the choice between two wages
always accepts the higher wage over the lower wage. Therefore any solution to (10) has w1 ≤ w2.
Since w1 is only exercised if w2 failed, (10) immediately implies that the choice of w1 only depends
on the expected return p(w1)w1. Therefore, the worker’s optimal decision resembles that of workers
with a single application and he chooses w1 such that
p(w1)w1 = u1. (11)
Taking this into account, any high wage w2 is optimal if it fulﬁlls
p(w2)w2 + (1 − p(w2))u1 = u2 ≡ max
w
{p(w)w + (1 − p(w))u1}, (12)
i.e. if it yields the highest payoﬀ given that the low application was sent optimally. Clearly any w1
solving (11) combined with a w2 solving (12) yields the highest possible payoﬀ and provides a solution
to maximization problem (10). Since the optimal solution can never include w1 > w2, this implies
that any solution to (11) has to be weakly lower than any solution to (12). The proposition follows
since ¯ w was deﬁned as the supremum of the wages that solve (11). Q.E.D.
Since all workers face the same maximization problem, the eﬀective queue length µ(w) and the corre-
sponding probability of being hired p(w) = (1−e−µ(w))/µ(w) at any wage w are governed by either one
of three possibilities: Very low wages are unattractive and do not receive applications, and therefore
the eﬀective queue length is zero. Wages in the intermediate range receive the low applications that
workers are only willing to send if optimality condition (11) for low wage applications holds, and high
wages receive high applications only if the optimality condition (12) for high wage applications is met.
We summarize this in the next proposition, which is formally proven in the appendix.
11Proposition 1 (Workers’ Application Behavior) In any equilibrium in which some workers send
applications, i.e. γ1 + γ2 > 0, the following conditions for the job ﬁnding probability p(w) hold, which
by (6) also determine µ(w):
p(w) = 1 ∀ w ∈ [0,u1] (13)
p(w)w = u1 ∀ w ∈ [u1,min{ ¯ w,1}] (14)
p(w)w + (1 − p(w))u1 = u2 ∀ w ∈ [ ¯ w,1], (15)
for some tuple (u1,u2) and ¯ w = u2
1/(2u1−u2). If no workers apply twice, i.e. γ2 = 0, then u2 = u1+c2.
The proposition includes speciﬁcations for at all wages, including those oﬀ the equilibrium path. By
the Market Utility Assumption workers are willing to apply to wages oﬀ the equilibrium path as long as
the wages are not too low, and therefore exactly the same logic applies as for wages on the equilibrium
path. It is worth pointing out that even if workers only send one application in equilibrium, if a ﬁrm
would oﬀer a very high wage workers might be willing to send a second application there. Workers are
just willing to do this if the marginal utility of the second application is exactly equal to the additional
cost, i.e. u2 − u1 = c2. This case will be relevant whenever ¯ w ≤ 1, otherwise the interval [ ¯ w,1] is
empty.
Proposition 1 is important for the subsequent derivations because it summarizes the schedule of
job ﬁnding probabilities p(·) uniquely by the two numbers (u1,u2) that represent the workers utility
from sending one and two applications (omitting application costs). These numbers will in equilibrium
be dependent on the wage distribution that ﬁrms oﬀer. Since the eﬀective queue length is related to
the probability of getting a job via p(w) = (1 − e−µ(w))/µ(w), also µ(·) is uniquely determined by
(u1,u2).
For given utility numbers we can illustrate the relationship between the eﬀective queue length and
the wage in the two-dimensional plane of Figure 1. The curve IC1 − IC1 describes the indiﬀerence
curve of workers for their low wage application, i.e. it describes all combinations of queue length and
wage that fulﬁll equation (14). The curve IC2 −IC2 describes the workers indiﬀerence curve over the
high applications as given in equation (15). IC2 is steeper than IC1 because of the fallback option
due to the low application, which induces workers to give up more of their employment chances for
an increase in the wage when the high wage is concerned than when the low wage is concerned. At
any wage the realized queue length has to lie on one of the two curves, because some worker has to be
willing to send either his low or his high application to that wage. Moreover, the realized queue length
can never be below either of the two curves as otherwise workers would have a proﬁtable deviation.
Therefore, the queue length has to lie on the upper contour of the IC1 and the IC2 curve, which is



















Figure 1: Illustration of market interaction for given (u1,u2). IC1 and IC2: Worker’s indiﬀerence curve for the
low and high wage applications, respectively. IP0: Isoproﬁt curve when all ﬁrms post the same wage.
IP1: Isoproﬁt curve in an equilibrium with two wages. Note that the tuple (u1,u2) and, thus, IC1
and IC2 will in general change when a positive measure of ﬁrms change their wage.
3.2 Firms’ Wage Setting
We now turn to the ﬁrms’ problem. Their iso-proﬁt curves (1 − e−µ)(1 − w) = π∗ are smooth convex
functions. The iso-proﬁt curves are illustrated by curves IP1 −IP1 and IP2 −IP2 in Figure 1, where
IP2 is the curve with the higher proﬁt level. Since an individual ﬁrm cannot inﬂuence the workers
utility levels (u1,u2), an individual ﬁrm knows that the eﬀective queue length that it will obtain is
given by the workers response, i.e. by the dashed line in Figure 1. The individual ﬁrm tries to ﬁnd
the point on the dashed line that maximizes its proﬁt. From the ﬁgure, we can obtain three insights
that we will subsequently verify analytically.
First, if some workers send two applications, then there has to be wage dispersion in equilibrium.
If ﬁrms would oﬀer the same wage, the dashed line will adjust exactly such that the kink is at the
oﬀered wage because only at the kink are workers willing to send both their applications to this wage.
The ﬁrms obtain the expected proﬁt level associated with ¯ w and ¯ µ and their iso-proﬁt curve is IP0.
Since the iso-proﬁt curve is smooth but the dashed curve is kinked because workers treat high and
13low wages diﬀerently, a deviant ﬁrm can move to higher proﬁts along the dashed line. In the ﬁgure
both higher and lower wages are proﬁtable deviations. This is not generally the case, yet one direction
always remains proﬁtable.
Second, the ﬁgure illustrates that a single wage leads to an ineﬃcient outcome when some workers
send two applications. The area between the workers indiﬀerence curves and the ﬁrms’ iso-proﬁt curve
is an area of mutual beneﬁt for workers and ﬁrms. We explore the reasons for the ineﬃciency at a
single wage in Section 4, yet note here that the ﬁrms’ incentives to exploit the unrealized gains is
exactly what rules out the single-wage equilibrium. A way to achieve eﬃciency is to have two market
wages such that the iso-proﬁt curve is tangent to the dashed (combined) indiﬀerence curve. This is
illustrated by iso-proﬁt curve IP1.11
Third, we see that two wages can indeed constitute an equilibrium: since the isoproﬁt curve is
tangent to both of the workers’ indiﬀerence curves, a deviation that places a ﬁrm at any other point
of the worker’s indiﬀerence curves moves the deviant to a strictly lower level of proﬁts.
In the following we will establish these three insights analytically. We start out by considering some
tuple (u1, u2) and associated cutoﬀ wage ¯ w which characterize the workers’ application behavior by
Proposition 1. We call ﬁrms that oﬀer wages below ¯ w low wage ﬁrms, and those oﬀering wage above ¯ w
high wage ﬁrms. The problem for each individual ﬁrm is to maximize proﬁts π(w) = (1−e−µ(w))(1−w),
given that µ(w) is governed by the application behavior of the workers summarized in equations
(13), (14) and (15). Using these equations to substitute out the wage and recalling that p(w) =
(1 − e−µ(w))/µ(w), we can write the ﬁrm’s maximization problem in terms of the eﬀective queue
length
π(µ) = 1 − e−µ − µu1 ∀ µ ∈ [0, ¯ µ], (16)
π(µ) = (1 − e−µ)(1 − u1) − µ(u2 − u1) ∀ µ ∈ [¯ µ,µ(1)], (17)
where ¯ µ = µ( ¯ w). In this formulation, the ﬁrm decides on the eﬀective queue length it wants to obtain.
Each queue lengths is associated with a unique wage that the ﬁrm has to pay in order to obtain it.
Therefore each queue length is associated with well deﬁned expected proﬁts. In terms of Figure 1,
the dashed curve tells the ﬁrm which wage it has to pay for given queue length. Using this way of
describing the individual ﬁrm’s proﬁts we can show that any equilibrium features wage dispersion
when at least some workers apply twice:
Proposition 2 (Wage Dispersion) In any equilibrium with γ2 > 0 the set of oﬀered wages F
cannot be a singleton.
11In general the workers’ indiﬀerence curves IC1 and IC2 change when the wage distribution changes because
utilities (u1,u2) will change. Under special conditions (i.e. particular choices of wages and the number of entering
ﬁrms) the utility levels remain constant, and we use this special case for easier graphical representation.
14The proof in the appendix follows the logic presented above: Assume there is a pooling wage that all
ﬁrms oﬀer, and assume that it is not proﬁtable to locally deviate to a lower wage. Due to the kink in
the workers’ response we show that a deviation to a higher wage has to be proﬁtable for an individual
ﬁrm, yielding the desired contradiction. We note that this reasoning diﬀers from most other work
on wage dispersion among homogeneous agents, which usually relies on a proﬁt discontinuity of the
following kind: If all ﬁrms oﬀer the same wage, sometimes a ﬁrm cannot hire because its applicant
accepts some other equally good alternative, and so a deviation to a slightly higher wage yields a jump
in proﬁts because now every applicant prefers this ﬁrm.12 In our setting the workers understand that
better hiring chances for the deviant mean lower chances for themselves, and they adjust their ap-
plication behavior accordingly. Therefore proﬁts are continuous. Dispersion arises nevertheless since
workers trade oﬀ wage and acceptance probability diﬀerently for upward deviations than for downward
deviations due to the availability of the fallback option at high wages, which leads to discontinuity in
the derivative of the proﬁt function. This suﬃces to induces wage dispersion.
Next we show that in an equilibrium in which some workers send two applications exactly two wages
are oﬀered: one strictly below and one strictly above ¯ w. This immediately implies that workers with
one application send it to the low wage, and workers with two applications send one to each of the
wages.
Proposition 3 (Discrete Set of Oﬀered Wages) In any equilibrium with γ2 > 0 exactly two dis-
tinct wages are oﬀered, i.e. F = {w∗
1,w∗
2}, and w∗
1 < ¯ w < w∗
2.
Proof: Since wage dispersion implies that not all wages are zero, u2 > u1 > 0. Individual ﬁrms take
u1, u2 and ¯ w as given. For low wage ﬁrms we can write proﬁts as a function of the queue length as in
(16). The function is strictly concave on [0, ¯ µ]. Therefore all low wage ﬁrms choose the same queue
length and, thus, the same wage. For high wage ﬁrms proﬁts can be written as in (17), which is strictly
concave on [¯ µ,µ(1)]. Therefore all high wage ﬁrms choose the same queue length and, thus, the same
wage. Finally, assume one group, say low wage ﬁrms, choose queue length ¯ µ with associated wage ¯ w.
Since there is wage dispersion, high wage ﬁrms oﬀer w∗
2 > ¯ w at queue length µ∗
2 > ¯ µ. But since their
problem is strictly concave on [¯ µ,1], they make strictly higher proﬁts than ﬁrms at ¯ µ, which yields
the desired contradiction. A similar argument rules out that ¯ µ is chosen by high wage ﬁrms. Q.E.D.
Given that only two wages are oﬀered in equilibrium, it will be convenient for the subsequent deriva-
tions to simplify notation by indexing variables that refer to low wage ﬁrms by 1 and those that
12This logic applies e.g. in Burdett and Judd (1983), Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Acemo˘ glu and Shimer
(2000), Gautier and Moraga-Gonz´ alez (2004) and Galenianos and Kircher (2006).
15refer to high wage ﬁrms by 2.13 Let ρ be the equilibrium fraction of ﬁrms oﬀering the high wage.
Then ρ2 = ρ and ρ1 = 1 − ρ are the fractions oﬀering each of the two wages, and vi = vρi is the
measure of ﬁrms at the respective wage. Equation (7) implies gross queue lengths λ2 = γ2/v2 and
λ1 = (γ1 + γ2)/v1, where each expression reﬂects the measure of applications at the respective wage
divided by the number of ﬁrms that oﬀer that wage. Workers that apply to the high wage w2 ac-
cept an oﬀer for sure and therefore all gross applications are also eﬀective applications, i.e. µ2 = λ2.
Therefore, the probability of obtaining a job at the high wage p2 = (1 − e−µ2)/µ2 is fully speciﬁed
by γ2 and v2. At the low wage, a fraction γ2/(γ1 + γ2) of the applicants also applies to w2 and are
unavailable for hiring if they get the better job. So by (8) a fraction ψ2 = p2γ2/(γ1 +γ2) of applicants
cannot be hired due to better oﬀers. Therefore the eﬀective number of applications per ﬁrm at the
low wage is µ1 = (1 − p2γ2/(γ1 + γ2))λ1, which then deﬁnes the probability p1 = (1 − e−µ1)/µ1 of
getting a job at the low wage as a function of γ1,γ2,v1 and v2. With these deﬁnitions we can express
equilibrium proﬁts and wages:
Corollary 1 In an equilibrium with γ2 > 0 proﬁts and wages for high and low wage ﬁrms, respectively,
are uniquely determined by γ1,γ2,v1 and v2 as
π1 = 1 − e−µ1 − µ1e−µ1, (18)
w∗
1 = µ1e−µ1/(1 − e−µ1), (19)
π2 = (1 − e−µ2 − µ1e−µ1)(1 − e−µ1), and (20)
w∗
2 = µ2e−µ2(1 − e−µ1)/(1 − e−µ2) + e−µ1. (21)
Proof: We know that neither low wage nor high wage ﬁrms are constrained by the boundaries of their
maximization problem, because the equilibrium wages are diﬀerent from ¯ w and it is easy to see that
w1 > 0 (otherwise workers would not apply) and w2 < 1 (otherwise high wage ﬁrms would make less
proﬁts than low wage ﬁrms). Therefore, for low wage ﬁrms the ﬁrst order condition of their proﬁts
(16) with respect to µ is necessary for optimality. It yields immediately
u1 = e−µ = e−µ1. (22)
The second equality follows since in equilibrium all low wage ﬁrms choose the same queue length, or
rather the wage associated with it. When substituted into (16) this leads to the expression for the
proﬁts. By (14) we know that w∗
1 = u1/p1 and we immediately get the corresponding wage. For high
13That is, let πi be the proﬁt, wi the wage, λi the gross queue length, µi the eﬀective queue length, ηi the
hiring probability, pi the probability of getting an oﬀer when applying at a type-i ﬁrm, and ψi the probability
that a worker accepts another oﬀer, where i = 1 when we refer to low wage ﬁrms and i = 2 when we refer to
high wage ﬁrms.
16wage ﬁrms, the ﬁrst order condition of proﬁts (17) with respect to µ implies
u2 − u1 = e−µ(1 − u1) = e−µ2(1 − e−µ1). (23)
Substitution back into (17) yields the expression for the proﬁts. By (15) we know that w∗
2 =
(u2 − u1)/p2 + u1, and substitution leads to the expression for the high wage. Q.E.D.
If workers no workers send two applications, then the arguments above easily establish that only one
wage is oﬀered (v2 = 0). The determination of the wage is identical to the low wage in the previous
corollary, i.e. it is determined by (19) and induces proﬁts given by (18). Given that workers only
apply once any oﬀer leads to a hire, and therefore µ1 = λ1 and the distinction between eﬀective and
gross queue length disappears. Therefore, for γ2 = 0 we get the standard result from one-application
models such as Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001). The introduction of a second application changes the
equilibrium and essentially generates two markets. The proﬁts in each are given by
πi = (1 − e−µi − µie−µi)(1 − ui−1). (24)
In the low wage market u0 is identical to the workers’ true outside option of zero, but there is some
connection to the high market induced by the strictly positive probability that an oﬀer is rejected.
In the high wage market the rejection probability is zero, but u1 is greater than zero as it reﬂects
the workers’ endogenous outside option induced by the presence of the low market. Apart from these
spillovers, each market operates essentially as a single one-application market.
3.3 Equilibrium Outcome
In this section we show existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. Before we turn to the full
equilibrium, it is instructive to consider the case with exogenous search intensity γ. We show existence
and uniqueness of an equilibrium with and without free entry.
Lemma 2 For given search intensity (γ0,γ1,γ2) with γ1 + γ2 > 0 it holds that
1. for given entry v > 0 there exists unique (F,G) that fulﬁlls the appropriate equilibrium conditions
1a), 2a) and 3;
2. with free entry there exists unique (v,F,G) that fulﬁlls the appropriate equilibrium conditions
1a), 1b), 2a) and 3.
Proof: We show part 2 here; part 1 is relegated to the appendix. The eﬀective queue length µ1 at the
low market wage is given by the zero proﬁt condition, which by (18) yields
1 − e−µ1 − µ1e−µ1 = K. (25)
17The left hand side of (25) is strictly increasing in µ1, is zero for µ1 = 0 and one for µ1 → ∞. Therefore,
µ1 is uniquely determined. This yields w1 by (19).
If γ2 > 0, the proﬁts for high wage ﬁrms is given by (20) and free entry implies
(1 − e−µ2 − µ2e−µ2)(1 − e−µ1) = K. (26)
Since µ1 is unique, µ2 is unique. The high wage is given by (21). Since µ∗
1 = (γ1 + γ2 − γ2p2)/v1
and µ∗
2 = γ2/v2, both v1 and v2 are uniquely determined. Workers send send their low application to
the low wage, and if they have a second application they send it to the high wage. By construction
there are not proﬁtable deviations from this proﬁle: ﬁrms are willing to oﬀer these wages since the
wages were determined by the appropriate ﬁrst order conditions and in each region the maximization
problem is concave. Workers are willing to apply in this fashion because we used their indiﬀerence
conditions (14) and (15) to construct the proﬁts. Q.E.D.
Now we turn to the analysis of the equilibrium when the fraction of agents that send zero, one or
two applications is endogenous. The free entry conditions (25) and (22) determine the eﬀective queue
lengths at the high and low wage solely as a function of the exogenous entry cost K, which in turn
determine the utility gain that workers can get by sending an additional application by (22) and (23).





as follows: Let µ∗
1 be the queue length that solves equation (25) for free entry at low wages. Given
this number, the utility that a worker can obtain with one application is (by the ﬁrst order condition
(22)) represented by number u∗
1 = e−µ∗
1. Let µ∗
2 be the queue length that solves equation (26) for
entry at the high wage when µ1 is replaced by number µ∗
1. This represents the queue length at the
high wage if such wage is oﬀered, and the worker obtains (by ﬁrst order condition (23)) an additional








1 represent the only candidates for the marginal utility gain for workers for
the ﬁrst and second application. They are independent of the exact structure of search intensity γ.
It turns out that the equilibrium is determined by comparing these marginal gains with the marginal
costs of sending the application. The following proposition is a stronger version of Summary 1 with
which we started the Section 3.
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium Outcomes) An equilibrium exists. Furthermore
1. For c1 > u∗
1 in the unique equilibrium no ﬁrm enters and no application is sent.
2. For c1 < u∗
1 and c2 > u∗
2 − u∗
1, in the unique equilibrium all workers send one application and
one wage is oﬀered.
3. For c1 < u∗
1 and c2 < u∗
2 − u∗
1, in the unique equilibrium all workers send two applications, two
wages are oﬀered, and each worker applies to each wage.
18The key reason for uniqueness is that ﬁrms anticipate that workers will send additional applications
when they oﬀer high wages (this is captured by the Market Utility Assumption). Even if in (a
candidate) equilibrium only one wage is oﬀered and workers only send one application, a ﬁrm that
deviates and oﬀers a suﬃciently high wage expects that workers will send a second application to this
very high wage. It is this feature that leads to a high queue length for a deviant with a high wage and
makes such a deviation proﬁtable whenever the marginal cost c2 is below the marginal beneﬁt u∗
2−u∗
1.
For completeness we note that in the case where c1 = u∗
1 we have a continuum of equilibria: for any
γ1 ∈ [0,1] and γ0 = 1−γ1 an equilibrium exists, and workers are exactly indiﬀerent between applying
once and not applying at all. If c2 = u∗
2−u∗
1 an equilibrium exists in which workers randomize between
one and two applications, i.e. for any γ2 ∈ [0,1] and γ1 = 1 − γ2 an equilibrium exists.
4 Eﬃciency
To discuss the eﬃciency properties of the equilibria just characterized, we follow Pissarides (2000)
and others. We restrict the planner to the same frictions as the market; i.e., we assume that the
planner can only assign symmetric strategies to workers, who are then matched according to the same
stable assignment process that we applied to the decentralized economy. We call an outcome eﬃcient
if it yields the highest output in the economy, taking into account the costs of entry and the costs of
sending applications.
While in equilibrium at most two wages are oﬀered, a planner could potentially specify any number
of wages in the pursuit of an optimal way by which workers apply to ﬁrms. To avoid some technical
complications, we restrict attention to ﬁnite sets of wages over which the planner maximizes. Let W
contain all ﬁnite sets of wages W = {w1,w2,...,wM} with 0 ≤ wi < wi+1 ≤ 1. Wages themselves do not
enter the eﬃciency notion directly since they only aﬀect the division of the surplus. They only enter
the problem indirectly as they deﬁne the rank-order of the ﬁrms for the stable matching. Denote by
ΦW
i the set of cumulative distribution functions with support on the set Wi. The planner can use any
ﬁnite set of wages W ∈ W, and assigns some level of entry v ∈ R+ and some wage distribution F ∈ ΦW
1 .
The planner also assigns the probability of sending zero, one or two applications and determines where
these applications are sent. That is, he chooses γ in the three dimensional probability simplex 43
and G ∈ ΦW
1 × ΦW
2 . We denote the planners choice set by PW.
In the following formal deﬁnition of eﬃciency let M(v,F,γ,G) = v
R 1
0 η(w)dF denote the number
of matches when η(w) is determined by (4) - (8) under tuple {v,F,γ,G}. The constrained eﬃcient
outcome maximizes the number of matches minus entry and application costs:
Deﬁnition 2 (Constrained Eﬃciency) Tuple {v,F,γ,G} ∈ PW, W ∈ W, is constrained eﬃcient
19if
M(v,F,γ,G) − vK − γ1c(1) − γ2c(2)
≥ M(v0,F0,γ0,G0) − v0K − γ0
1c(1) − γ0
2c(2) (27)
for any {v0,F0,γ0,G0} ∈ PW0
with W0 ∈ W.
The model has three margins of eﬃciency. 1. The number of matches that are achieved. 2. The
entry by ﬁrms. 3. The search intensity. We show that the economy achieves eﬃciency along all
three dimensions, which implies that interventions in the labor market are not warranted on eﬃciency
grounds unless they tackle the underlying frictions.
Proposition 5 (Eﬃciency) The equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient.
We prove the proposition in the next three subsections. We ﬁrst show that the number of matches
is optimal under the appropriate subset of equilibrium conditions even if the number of ﬁrms and
the search intensity are ﬁxed. Then we additionally analyze entry by including the appropriate free
entry condition and show that also entry is optimal. Finally, we also consider the endogenous search
intensity and show that the entire equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient. We discuss the assumptions
that lead to eﬃciency and the diﬀerence to models without stable assignment in the forth subsection.
4.1 Search Eﬃciency
For a given vector of search intensity γ = (γ0,γ1,γ2) and given entry of ﬁrms v, we show that the way
workers apply for jobs as characterized in the ﬁrst part of Lemma 2 is constrained eﬃcient.
We start by analyzing a narrow concept that we call two-group-eﬃciency. In analogy to the
decentralized outcome ﬁrst assume that the planner uses only two wages W = {w1,w2} and assigns
application strategies such that workers with one application apply to the low wage and those with
two applications apply to both wages.14 This restricts the planner to use only two groups of ﬁrms, one
that receives high and one that receives low or single applications. Throughout the eﬃciency analysis
we will adopt the same notation that we used for the analysis of equilibrium play in connection with
Corollary 1. The planners’ only choice variable under these restrictions is the fraction of ﬁrms that
oﬀers each of the two wages. We say that the search process is two-group-eﬃcient if the fraction ρ of
the high wage ﬁrms is chosen to maximize the number of matches given the assumptions just made
about the workers’ application strategy.
Lemma 3 For a given v > 0 and γ = (γ0,γ1,γ2) with γ2 > 0, the strategy combination implied by
equilibrium conditions 1a), 2a) and 3) yields two-group-eﬃciency.
14That is, suppG1 = {w1}, suppG2
1 = {w1} and suppG2
2 = {w2}
20Proof: Two-group-eﬃciency is obtained as a solution to
max
ρ∈[0,1]
M(ρ) = ρv(1 − e−µ2) + (1 − ρ)v(1 − e−µ1), (28)
where the ﬁrst term reﬂects the size of high wage ﬁrms times their matching probability. Similarly,
the second term accounts for the low wage ﬁrms. Recalling the notation, we have pi = (1 − e−µi)/µi

























= (1 − e−λ2 − λ2e−λ2)(1 − e−µ1) − (1 − e−µ1 − µ1e−µ1) = 0, (29)
where the last equality gives the ﬁrst order condition. (29) coincides with the equal proﬁt condition be-
tween high and low wage ﬁrms. By the proof of Lemma 2 part 1 we know that this uniquely determines
the measure of ﬁrms in each of the groups. Therefore, the number of high wage ﬁrms in equilibrium
coincides with the number of high wage ﬁrms that a planner would choose. Optimality is ensured by
global concavity since d2M/dρ2 = −v[λ2
2e−λ2(1−e−µ1)/ρ+e−µ1(1−e−λ2 −λ2e−λ2 −µ1)2/(1−ρ)] < 0.
Q.E.D.
Next we show that the search outcome is constrained eﬃcient without a priori restricting the planner
to use two wages. The proof in the appendix relies on a variational argument that establishes that
any search strategy can be weakly improved upon by the two-group-eﬃcient one.
Proposition 6 (Search Eﬃciency) For given entry v and given search intensity γ, the search pro-







for any W0 ∈ W when {F,G} conform to equilibrium conditions 1a), 2a) and 3.
Finally, we show that diﬀerences in hiring probabilities between diﬀerent ﬁrms are indeed necessary
to obtain the eﬃcient solution when some workers send two applications. Diﬀerences in wages induce
workers to search in a way that implements these diﬀerences in hiring probabilities. If only a single
wage were oﬀered, i.e. if wage oﬀer distribution has support F = {w} for some w, then all ﬁrms would
have the same hiring probability, which we show to be ineﬃcient.
21Proposition 7 (Ineﬃciencies without Wage Dispersion) If some workers send two applications,
identical hiring probabilities for all ﬁrms cannot be constrained eﬃcient. In speciﬁc, a single wage at
which all ﬁrms face the same eﬀective queue length is not constrained eﬃcient. Formally, given





M(v,F0,γ,G0) when W0 has at least two elements.
In the proof we show that even when we use two wages (instead of e.g. one wage) and have all workers
send their high application to the high wage and their low or single application to the low wage, we
can replicate a situation in which all ﬁrms have identical hiring probabilities. This can be achieved
by placing the appropriate fraction of ﬁrms at each wage. Then we show that such arrangement is
not optimal because too few ﬁrms oﬀer the low wage. The reasoning is the following: Workers that
end up taking jobs with low wage ﬁrms were unsuccessful with their high wage applications. The low
wage ﬁrms are their last chance to avoid unemployment. On the other hand those workers that take
a job at high wage ﬁrms might have gotten a job at a ﬁrm in the low wage group. Increasing workers’
matching probability at the low wage at the cost of decreasing their matching probability at high wage
ﬁrms improves matching for those workers for whom it is the last option to avoid unemployment. This
beneﬁt outweighs the expense of a lower matching probability for those who still might have another
option.
Wage dispersion decentralizes the eﬃcient outcome by attracting fewer applications per ﬁrm at the
low wage. This provides an endogenous safety net at low wage jobs because they are relatively easy to
obtain. Without wage dispersion workers equalize the queue length at all ﬁrms and a safety net would
not be possible, rendering eﬃciency unattainable.15 This result is surprising because with a single
application diﬀerent hiring probabilities are only warranted when there are productivity diﬀerences.16
Here the source for diﬀerent hiring probabilities is a sorting externality: Diﬀerent hiring probabilities
help to distinguish between workers who might be able to obtain some other job and workers who have
no other options. Figure 1 illustrates that two wages enable a situation without eﬃciency gains since
the iso-proﬁt and the indiﬀerence curves are tangent.17 With only one wage, areas for improvement
always arise because workers want to obtain ”insurance” with their low applications, while they do not
mind to take more ”risk” with the other application as they internalize that the low application acts
as a fall-back option. The workers’ interest is consistent with the social beneﬁt of matching agents
15Our assumption of anonymity trivially induces equal hiring probabilities at ﬁrms with the same wage. Even
if we only impose symmetric application strategies it is clear that the queue length at all ﬁrms with the same
wage has to be equal, otherwise workers would prefer to change their behavior and apply to the ﬁrms with the
lower eﬀective queues.
16Shimer (2005) analyzes productivity diﬀerences when only one application is possible. If workers and ﬁrms
are homogenous an identical hiring probability among all ﬁrms and all workers, respectively, is eﬃcient (similar
to our case for γ1 > 0 = γ2), and only with heterogeneities diﬀerences in hiring probabilities are eﬃcient.
17 In models where ﬁrms only make one oﬀer as in Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2006) and Galenianos and
Kircher (2006) such a ﬁgure would look very diﬀerently: next to the wage both the gross queue length λ(·) and
the retention probability ψ(·) remain separately important in such models, and three dimensions are needed.
22with higher probability at their low application, yet a single wage does not allow such a distinction in
matching probabilities.
4.2 Entry eﬃciency
We now add the entry decision to our eﬃciency analysis. The intuition for the following eﬃciency
result can be gained by considering equation (24) that describes the equilibrium proﬁts of ﬁrms in each
interval of wages. The social beneﬁt that is created by a match is 1 − ui, i.e. the excess productivity
over the expected output at the next lower wage.18 The share of this beneﬁt that accrues to the ﬁrm
is 1 − e−µi − µie−µi, which coincides with the elasticity of the matching function. This share takes
into account that workers might obtain jobs at higher wages. Hosios’ (1990) well-known eﬃciency
condition for models with one application requires such a split of the surplus for eﬃcient entry. Since
this modiﬁed version of the Hosios’ condition is satisﬁed for each wage segment, the eﬃcient measure
of ﬁrms enters each segment.
Let M∗(v,γ) be the number of matches given search intensity γ and entry v when search behavior
is constrained eﬃcient as analyzed in the preceding subsection. For given γ we have determined the
unique level of entry in the second part of Lemma 2. Here we show:
Proposition 8 (Entry Eﬃciency) Given search intensity γ, entry is constrained eﬃcient. That is
M∗(v,γ) − vK = max
v0≥0
M∗(v0,γ) − v0K, (30)
where v arises when equilibrium conditions 1a), 1b), 2a) and 3 are fulﬁlled.
Proof: The number of matches is given by M∗(v,γ) = 1−γ2
Q2
i=1(1−pi)−γ1(1−p1), where p1 and
p2 are the probabilities of getting a job at low wage and high wage ﬁrms, respectively, under eﬃcient
search. If γ0 = 1, then v = 0 arises and is clearly optimal. If γ0 < 1, clearly v = 0 is not optimal
given K < 1. v → ∞ is also not optimal since the number of matches is bounded by the measure of
workers but costs would grow unboundedly. The ﬁrst order condition to the problem is
K = γ2[dp1/dv](1 − p2) + γ2[dp2/dv](1 − p1) + γ1[dp1/dv]
= [dp1/dv](γ1 + γ2)(1 − ψ1) + [dp2/dv](1 − p1). (31)
pi depends on v directly since the measure ρv of high wage ﬁrms depends on v directly. It also depends
on v indirectly since the two-group-eﬃcient fraction ρ of high wage ﬁrms is a function of v. Since
this fraction maximizes the number of matches given v, by the envelop theorem the indirect eﬀect is
zero. Consider the ﬁrst term on the right hand side ﬁrst. We can write dp1/dv = [dp1/dµ1][dµ1/dv].
18Under free entry ﬁrms obtain no surplus, and the workers utility ui indeed reﬂects productivity.
23One can show that [dµ1/dv](γ1 + γ2)(1 − ψ2) = −(1 − ρ)µ2
1 − γ2µ1[dp2/dv]. Noting that dp1/dv =
−[(1 − e−µ1 − µ1e−µ1)/µ2
1][dµ1/dv] = −[(p1 − e−µ1)/µ1][dµ1/dv] we obtain
[dp1/dv](1 − p2) = (1 − ρ)(1 − e−µ1 − µ1e−µ1) + γ2(p1 − e−µ1)[dp2/dv].
Then (31) reduces to
K = (1 − ρ)(1 − e−µ1 − µ1e−µ1) + γ2(1 − e−µ1)[dp2/dv]
= (1 − ρ)(1 − e−µ1 − µ1e−µ1) + ρ(1 − e−µ1)(1 − e−µ2 − µ2e−µ2)
= 1 − e−µ1 − µ1e−µ1,
where the second line follows by taking the appropriate derivative and the last line follows as a
consequence of eﬃcient search (see (29)). The last line also denotes the proﬁts of low wage ﬁrms
in equilibrium. Applying (29) again yields a condition equal to the proﬁts of high wage ﬁrms. The
ﬁrst order condition is unique by the same argument that established that there is a unique entry v
that implies zero proﬁts (Lemma 2, part 2). Therefore, the entry implied by equilibrium conditions
1a), 1b), 2a) and 3 coincides with the entry implied by the ﬁrst order condition. Since the ﬁrst order
condition is unique and boundary solutions are not optimal, it describes the global optimum. Q.E.D.
4.3 Eﬃciency of Search Intensity
The number of applications that workers send in equilibrium is also constrained eﬃcient. We account
for the associated entry of ﬁrms and the search outcome, and therefore also immediately establish the
overall constrained eﬃciency of the equilibrium. This proves Proposition 5.
To gain intuition for the eﬃciency of the number of applications, consider the case where two wages
are oﬀered and a worker contemplates whether he should send two applications rather than one. The
second application has by (23) a private marginal beneﬁt of e−µ∗
2(1 − e−µ∗
1). Private marginal costs
are −c2. Additional production arises only if the high ﬁrm does not have another eﬀective applicant
but the low ﬁrm does, which has probability e−µ∗
2(1 − e−µ∗
1). Social and private beneﬁts coincide.
Note that the marginal beneﬁt is independent of the economy wide vector of search intensity γ, and
therefore the decisions of other workers summarized in γ provide no externality on the individual.
This is due to the optimal entry of ﬁrms, which absorbs any such externalities.
Let v(γ) be the entry for a given vector of search intensity γ as implied by equilibrium conditions
1a), 1b), 2a) and 3. Then M∗∗(γ) = M∗(v(γ),γ) denotes optimal number of matches for a given
vector γ of applications given optimal entry and optimal search decisions as analyzed in the preceding
subsection.
Proposition 9 (Eﬃciency of Search Intensity and Overall Eﬃciency)




Proof: For a given γ we know that equilibrium conditions 1a), 1b), 2a) and 3 yield the optimal
entry and the optimal number of matches. Moreover, under these conditions ﬁrms always receive zero
proﬁts and all surplus accrues to workers. Comparing diﬀerent γ, it is immediate that each worker
always attains a marginal utility of u∗
1 − c1 for his ﬁrst application, and u∗
2 − u∗
1 − c2 for his second
application. The eﬃcient search intensity is, therefore, given when workers send applications whenever
their marginal beneﬁt is larger than their marginal cost. Proposition 4 specify such socially optimal
behavior. For the case where c1 = u∗
1 (or c2 = u∗
2 − u∗
1) the privat and social beneﬁts of the ﬁrst
(or second) application are zero, and therefore every equilibrium for this case is constrained eﬃcient.
Q.E.D.
4.4 Discussion of the Eﬃciency Properties
Eﬃciency in our model arises because ﬁrms can “price” the good they are interested in: the queue
of eﬀective applications. The pricing works through the reaction by workers. Workers care only
about rival applicants that are eﬀective, i.e. they care about rival applicants that do not get jobs at
higher wages. Only such applicants make it diﬃcult to get a job at any wage. Applicants that are
not eﬀective because they accept better jobs do not prevent other workers from getting a job. If a
ﬁrm changes its wage, workers react by changing the queue of eﬀective applications until they are
indiﬀerent between this wage and the other wages oﬀered in the market. This allows ﬁrms to price
the eﬀective applications at marginal cost and achieve eﬃciency.
In models without a stable assignment as in Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2006) and Galenianos
and Kircher (2006) ﬁrms cannot price the good they are interested in. If each ﬁrm can only make
a single oﬀer and remains vacant if that oﬀer gets rejected even when the ﬁrm has other applicants,
then workers care about all rival applicants. Any applicant that applies for a job might receive an
oﬀer and blocks that job even if he decides to take a diﬀerent position. Therefore, when a ﬁrm raises
its wage workers respond by raising the queue of total (gross) applications to a new level at which
they are indiﬀerent this job and the other options in the market. This may not, however, result in
more eﬀective applications. If workers change their application behavior to other ﬁrms such that they
get higher wage jobs more easily, the eﬀective number of applications may actually go down. Firms
cannot price the queue of eﬀective applications that they are interested in, and eﬃciency does not
obtain.
This distinction between gross and eﬀective applications has not been considered in the literature
because in models in which workers only have one application the two notions coincide: With one
application no worker rejects an oﬀer, and every application is eﬀective.19 Our model encompasses the
19This also holds for models that incorporate search intensity in a more reduced-form way through a scalar
25one application case when the cost of the ﬁrst application is small while the cost for two applications
is prohibitively high (c(1) → 0 and c(2) → ∞). When we allow for general cost structures, the model
extends to more applications and more wages, but within each wage segment the interaction remains
similar to the one application model. In particular, the Hosios (1990) condition that ties the division of
the match surplus to the elasticity of the matching function and ensures that private and social surplus
in the market coincide holds per wage segment once the appropriate notion of eﬀective applications is
applied. Therefore, earlier results on eﬃcient entry in one-application models naturally extend to our
setup, and eﬃciency even carries over to the additional margins of number of applications and where
to send the various applications.
The eﬃciency property of this model relies on the combination of wage commitments and stability.
Wage commitments are important because they determine the terms of trade in a competitive manner
before the market splits into small groups in which market forces do not lead to eﬃcient outcomes.
Weakening commitment by introducing methods for adjusting the terms of trade after the applica-
tions are sent might therefore change the results regarding eﬃciency.20 In the theoretical analysis
wage commitments have the additional advantage of allowing for a particularly tractable notion of
stability that allows us to study the earlier stages of ﬁrm entry, wage setting and application behavior
analytically. The assumption of wage commitments might be particularly applicable in markets in
which large ﬁrms apply hiring policies uniformly to the entire organization. It seems also reason-
able when the “wage” oﬀers are interpreted more broadly as investments into prestige or amenities
which are valued by the workers but cannot easily be adapted to the speciﬁc bargaining situation. It
also applies when working conditions including wages are speciﬁed in advance of the application and
matching process, as e.g. in the US market for medical residents.21 Since other environments might
not feature full commitment, it would be interesting to investigate forms of adjustments of the wage
announcement in the ﬁnal stage according to the application conditions that each ﬁrm and worker
faces. This introduces strategic elements into the last step whose feedbacks to earlier stages render
such analysis beyond the scope of this paper.
that increases the matching probability but yields at most one job at a time (see e.g. Moen (1995)).
20In Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2006) ﬁrms’ wage announcements are not complete commitments, but
ﬁrms bid the wage up to the worker’s marginal product if two ﬁrms make an oﬀer to the same worker. This
has the eﬀect that workers are mainly interested in two oﬀers even if the announced wages are very low, which
contributes to depressed wages and excessive entry.
21Ross (1984, p. 995-996) points out that in this market hospitals specify the job requirements and wages,
then residents have to apply and interview with hospitals, and ﬁnally both sides of the market submit rankings
of those partners with whom they have interviewed for a stable matching. While this paper is targeted to general
job markets and might not reﬂect the details of this speciﬁc market – in particular we neglect heterogeneities
here – it highlights the eﬃciency properties even of the decentralized application procedure.
265 Generalization to N > 2 applications
In this section we dispense with the restriction that workers cannot send more than two applications.
Understanding the general case is important for several reasons. First, it allows us to assess the scope
of the results of the earlier sections. The analysis reveals that the number of applications and the
corresponding number of wages increase as the costs of applying decrease, and thus is not endogenously
limited to the search for at most two alternatives as in other simultaneous search models (see e.g.
Burdett and Judd (1983), Acemoglu and Shimer (2000)). Second, it has been argued that explicit
forms of search intensity based on simultaneous search can be useful to understand the response of
workers to varying labor market conditions (see Shimer (2004)), and we will see that the formulation in
a directed search framework like ours remains particularly tractable and is, thus, potentially useful for
the study of such wider questions. Finally, the general case allows us to study the market interaction
as applications costs vanish, and we show that this induces convergence to the unconstrained eﬃcient
Walrasian outcome.
We consider the case where workers can send any number i ∈ N0 of applications, at a cost c(i).
We retain the assumption that c(0) = 0 and that marginal costs ci = c(i) − c(i − 1) are weakly
increasing. We also assume c(i) > 0 for some i ∈ N. Together with increasing marginal costs this
implies a largest integer N such that c(N) ≤ 1. Clearly, it is neither individually nor socially optimal
to send more than N applications because application costs would exceed the value created in a match.
Thus, the number of applications per individual remains bounded. Apart from the larger number of
possible applications that each worker is allowed to send the model remains unchanged. The formal
adjustments that are necessary to extend the setup to more than two applications are presented in
the appendix.
The characterization of the equilibrium extends by analogy to the previous section. Again, the













recursively deﬁne the eﬀective queue length µ∗
i at the ith highest wage as a function of entry cost K,
given initial condition u∗
0 = 0.22 Equation (32) equates the competitive proﬁts to the entry cost in
analogy to equations (25) and (26), while equation (32) captures the outside option that lower wage
segments induce for higher wage segments in analogy to equations (22) and (23). Note that u∗
i −u∗
i−1
22Associated wages are wi = (µ∗
ie−µ
∗
i /(1 − e−µ
∗
i ))(1 − u∗
i−1) + u∗
i−1.
27is strictly decreasing in i, while ci is weakly increasing. In the appendix we show
Proposition 10 (Generalized Equilibrium Properties) An equilibrium exists. It is constrained
eﬃcient. Generically it is unique: if ci∗ < u∗
i∗ −u∗
i∗−1 and ci∗+1 > u∗
i∗+1 −u∗
i∗, every workers sends i∗
applications, i∗ wages are oﬀered, and every worker applies to each wage.
The proof relies essentially on an induction of the arguments presented in Sections 3 and 4 to higher
numbers of applications, and is relegated to the appendix. The workers again partition the wages
into intervals related to each of their applications. The equilibrium interaction in each interval cor-
responds to that in the one application case, again with the adjustment that the workers “outside
option” incorporates the expected utility that can be obtained at lower wages, while the queue length
incorporates the fact that some applicants are lost to higher wage ﬁrms. Eﬃciency obtains again for
similar reasons, only that now i∗ wages are necessary to obtain the optimal allocation in the search
process.
5.1 Convergence to the Competitive Outcome
We now show that the equilibrium allocation converges to the unconstrained eﬃcient allocation of
a competitive economy when application costs become small. A competitive economy achieves the
following allocation: Since entry costs are below the productivity of a match ﬁrms enter until the
measure of ﬁrms equals the measure of workers. All workers and all ﬁrms get matched. Since free
entry places ﬁrms on the long side of the market, ﬁrms are just compensated for their entry cost K.
The market wage is then 1 − K and coincides with the utility of each worker.
We consider a sequence of cost functions such that the marginal cost of the i’th application
converges to zero for all i ∈ N. Rather than looking at these of functions directly, it is convenient
to simply consider the associated equilibrium number i∗ of applications that each worker sends.23
Vanishing costs amounts to i∗ → ∞. Let v(i∗) denote the equilibrium measure of active ﬁrms, while
η(i∗) =
R
η(w)dF and σ(i∗) = v(i∗)η(i∗) denote the average probability of being matched for a ﬁrm
and a worker in the economy. Let w(i∗) denote the average wage conditional on being matched and
U∗(i∗) = u∗
i∗ − ci∗
(i∗) the equilibrium utility when i∗ applications are sent, where ci∗
(·) denotes some
cost function that supports an equilibrium with i∗ applications per worker. We show that
Proposition 11 (Convergence) The equilibrium outcome converges to the competitive outcome,
i.e., limi∗→∞ v(i∗) = 1, limi∗→∞ η(i∗) = limi∗→∞ σ(i∗) = 1 and limi∗→∞ w(i∗) = limi∗→∞ U∗(i∗) =
1 − K.
23For the case of multiple equilibria, consider for simplicity the case where all workers send the same number
of applications.
28The structure of the proof uses the intuition for the competitive economy: For a given measure v of
active ﬁrms the competitive economy implies that (only) the long side of the market gets rationed
and the short side appropriates all surplus. We show that for small frictions (i∗ large) this still holds
approximately. Then it trivially follows that v(i∗) → 1 because otherwise the ﬁrms either generate
to much or too little proﬁts to cover entry. Since nearly all agents get matched, zero proﬁts imply a
wage of 1−K. Despite the fact that workers send more applications, the costs vanish faster than the
increase in the number of applications and therefore their utility equals the wage of 1−K in the limit.
5.2 Conclusion
This paper incorporates a micro-foundation for search intensity into a directed search framework.
In this setting directed search can be interpreted as strategic but frictional link formation between
workers and ﬁrms.24 Search intensity can be viewed as a choice on the number of links by the
worker. We consider a stable allocation on the network. Firms’ wage announcements price the network
eﬃciently, given the workers’ coordination problem. Equilibrium wage dispersion turns out to be the
optimal response of the market to the presence of frictions, since it allows for a network structure that
minimizes coordination failure by providing an endogenous safety net at low wages for applicants that
were unsuccessful at obtaining high wage jobs. The stable resolution of the ﬁnal matching problem
allows the wage to endogenize all other externalities that are present in earlier stages.
An interesting avenue for future work is the integration of a time dimension into the hiring process
that allows workers to apply again if they fail to secure a job. Simultaneous applications to multiple
jobs are likely to be important when the time delay between the application process and the ﬁnal
hiring decision is non-trivial. Delays might be pronounced in many occupations, especially in the high
skill sector. Delays are obviously severe when institutional restrictions conﬁne hiring to designated
dates, as in occupations with annual job markets. Another area for future research is the incorporation
of heterogeneity into the model, which would yield additional insights into the interplay between the
ﬁnal matching stage and the earlier application stage.
6 Appendix
Deﬁnition and Discussion of the Market Utility Assumption:
Subgame perfection cannot be straightforwardly applied to large directed search economies for a
technical reason: The restriction to symmetric strategies by workers implies that all workers have to
24The large literature in network formation usually deploys solution concepts that eliminate any randomness
on which a frictional nature of unemployment could be based because they require that no (pair of) individ-
uals would choose links diﬀerently after the network has been realized (see e.g. Dutta and Jackson (2000),
Jackson (2005)). Our equilibrium notion requires ex-ante optimality before applications are sent out and uses
miscoordination to retain frictions in the spirit of the search literature on unemployment.
29apply with equal probability to a deviant. With a continuum of workers each one of them assigns
negligible probability to the deviant that cannot be well speciﬁed.
The standard approach in the literature to capture the idea of subgame perfection is the Market
Utility Assumption. In our multiple application case, workers can obtain utility U∗
i = maxw∈Fi Ui(w)
from sending i applications to non-deviant ﬁrms. By choosing the number i ∈ I of applications, they
can obtain a Market Utility of U∗
I = maxi∈I U∗
i . Now consider some deviant ﬁrm with wage w / ∈ F and
assume his queue length were µ(w) ∈ [0,∞], which deﬁnes the workers’ probability p(w) of getting an
oﬀer as in (6). At this queue length a worker who applies there with one application obtains utility
ˆ U1 = U1(w) given by (2). A workers who applies to w and to some wage oﬀered by another ﬁrm
obtains at best ˆ U2 = max{sup ˜ w∈F U2( ˜ w,w),sup ˜ w∈F U2( ˜ w,w)}, where the two expressions in the outer
maximization operator distinguish the case where the other ﬁrm oﬀers a lower wage from the case
where the other ﬁrm oﬀers a higher wage. The maximum utility from applying to the deviant is then
ˆ UI = maxi∈I ˆ Ui, where ˆ U0 = 0.
Deﬁnition 3 (Market Utility Assumption)
For any w ∈ [0,1], the expected queue µ(w) > 0 of eﬀective applicants is such that applicants obtain
the Market Utility, i.e. U∗
I = ˆ UI(w). If U∗
I < ˆ UI(w) for all µ(w) > 0, then µ(w) = 0.
The assumption speciﬁes that workers obtain the Market Utility not only at oﬀered wages, but also at
wages oﬀered by deviating ﬁrms. This is based on the idea that if the queue length were higher workers
would want to withdraw applications and thus decrease the queue length, while they would like to
send more if the queue were lower and thus increase the queue length.25 Throughout our analysis we
impose the Market Utility Assumption. The set of application choices is I = {1,2} for Sections 3 and
4 and I = {1,...,N} for section 5. In the special case of lemma 2 where we analyze the interaction for
an exogenously ﬁxed vector of applications {γ0,γ1,γ2} we restrict I for logical consistency to include
only those indexes i with γi > 0, since no workers are allowed to pursue other options. To impose the
Market Utility Assumption beyond the equilibrium requirements does not change the set of equilibria:
Lemma 4 Any equilibrium {v,F,γ,G} can be sustained with a belief according to the Market Utility
Assumption.
Proof: Consider any equilibrium {v,F,γ,G} which is supported by belief µ(·). Consider ﬁrst positive
entry v > 0. Observe that µ(w) conforms by equilibrium condition 2a) to the Market Utility Assump-
tion at all wages w ∈ G ≡ suppG1 ∪ suppG2
1 ∪ suppG2
2 to which workers apply. If F * G then by
(7) some ﬁrms have zero queue length and make zero proﬁts, and then by equilibrium condition 1 all
ﬁrms do, which means v = 0 and thus a contradiction. Therefore, F ⊆ G, and µ(w) conforms to the
market utility assumption at all w ∈ F.
Now deﬁne a diﬀerent belief ˆ µ(·) that conforms to the Market Utility Assumption at all w ∈ [0,1].
On F the trade-oﬀs for all agents remain unchanged. Under ˆ µ(·) workers are indiﬀerent to applying
to wages in [0,1] by construction, and so condition 2a) is not violated. Now observe that ˆ µ(w) ≤ µ(w)
for all w ∈ [0,1]\F. To see this, assume ˆ µ(w) > µ(w) at some w ∈ [0,1]\F. Since under ˆ µ(w) workers
25While the arguments presented here only intuitively appeal to ”reasonable” responses of workers to deviating
wage oﬀers, papers by Peters (1991, 1997, 2000) and Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) rigorously establish
equivalence of the Market Utility Assumption and the subgame perfect response in (a limit of) ﬁnite economies
in which workers send one application. Multiple applications induce additional complications in ﬁnite economies
that only disappear in the limit, since success at one application is revealing about the success of the other in
ﬁnite environments (see Albrecht et al. (2005)).
30are indiﬀerent to applying to the oﬀ-equilibrium wage w, they strictly prefer the oﬀ-equilibrium w
under µ(w) over the wages in the support of their randomization. This violates 2a) and µ(·) cannot
have sustained the equilibrium. Since ˆ µ(w) ≤ µ(w) for all w ∈ [0,1]/F, deviations by ﬁrms are weakly
less attractive under ˆ µ(w) than under µ(w), and equilibrium condition 1 is also fulﬁlled.
Now consider v = 0. Then 2b) and 3 imply γ0 = 1. By 2b) µ(w) has to be such that p(w)w ≤ c1.
The Market Utility Assumption yields eﬀective queue length ˆ µ(w) such that ˆ p(w)w = c1 if ˆ µ(w) > 0.
By construction no worker wants to change his behavior. Moreover, ˆ p(w) ≥ p(w) implies ˆ µ(w) ≤ µ(w)
and ﬁrms are less willing to enter under ˆ µ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1:
At any wage w < u1 the Market Utility cannot be obtained, yielding µ(w) = 0 by the Market
Utility Assumption. Also at wage w = u1, µ(w) > 0 would imply that the Market Utility cannot be
reached. Wages strictly above u1 have µ(w) > 0, as otherwise p(w)w = w > u1 and workers would
receive more than the Market Utility when applying there. We have shown that it is optimal to send
low applications to wages below ¯ w, which implies that (11) has to hold for all wages in (u1, ¯ w] in order
to provide the Market Utility.
For γ2 > 0, it is optimal to apply with the high application to wages above ¯ w, and the eﬀective
queue length is therefore governed by (12). The eﬀective queue length has to be continuous at ¯ w, as
otherwise the job ﬁnding probability p(w) for workers would be discontinuous and some wage in the
neighborhood of ¯ w would oﬀer a utility diﬀerent from the Market Utility. Therefore ¯ w is determined
as the wage where both (11) and (12) hold.
Even when γ2 = 0 the workers might prefer to send a second application if a high wage were
oﬀered. Assume the queue length would be governed by (11) for all wages in (u1,1]. If p(w)w + (1 −
p(w))u1 − c2 ≥ u1, workers would strictly like to send a second application, which contradicts with
equilibrium condition 2a). In this case at higher wages the queue length is again governed by (12),
only that u2 = u1 + c2 ensures that workers are indiﬀerent between sending two or one application in
accordance with the Market Utility Assumption. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Consider a (candidate) equilibrium in which all active ﬁrms oﬀer wage w∗ ∈ (0,1). Almost all
applications are sent to w∗ because of (7) and equilibrium condition 2a) on worker optimality. w∗ > 0
then implies u1 = p(w∗)w∗ > 0. Moreover w∗ = ¯ w. If not, i.e. ¯ w > w∗ or ¯ w < w∗, then a mass
of applications would be sent strictly above or below the oﬀered wage, which leads by (7) to a zero
probability of getting a job and violates workers optimality 2b). Then proﬁts for wages above w∗ are
given by (17), for wages in [p(w∗)w∗,w∗] by (16), and for wages below p(w∗)w∗ proﬁts are zero.
The left derivative of the proﬁts with respect to the queue length at ¯ µ = µ(w∗) is obtained by the
diﬀerentiating (16) to get π0
−(¯ µ) = e−¯ µ − u1, and the right derivative by diﬀerentiating (17) which
yields π0
+(¯ µ) = e−¯ µ(1 − u1) − (u2 − u1). In equilibrium it needs to hold that ﬁrms neither want to
increase their wage nor decrease their wage. This leads to π0
+(¯ µ) ≤ 0 ≤ π0
−(¯ µ). But π0
+(¯ µ) ≤ π0
−(¯ µ)
implies
−e−¯ µu1 − (u2 − u1) ≤ −u1. (32)
For a single market wage it holds that u2 = u1 + (1 − ¯ p)u1 with ¯ p = 1−e−¯ µ
¯ µ . We can therefore write
31u2 − u1 = (1 − ¯ p)u1. Then (32) reduces to
(1 − e−¯ µ − ¯ µe−¯ µ)u1 ≤ 0. (33)
We know that u1 > 0 since w∗ > 0. Since workers send a strictly positive measure of applications we
have ¯ µ > 0, and it is easily shown that the term in brackets is strictly positive in this case, yielding
the desired contradiction.
For the extremes, consider w∗ = 1 ﬁrst. At w∗ = 1 ﬁrms make zero proﬁts. Since the eﬀective
queue length at wages close to 1 is positive by (14), wages below one provide proﬁtable deviations.
Now consider w∗ = 0. Equilibrium proﬁts are strictly smaller than one because not all ﬁrms get
matched. (15) implies that at wages w0 > 0 ﬁrms can hire for sure, i.e. the eﬀective queue length at
wages above zero is inﬁnity. Therefore, small increases in the wage are proﬁtable. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2, part 1:
Instead of equations (25) and (26), we now have
1 − e−µ1 − µ1e−µ1 = ˆ π, (34)
(1 − e−µ2 − µ2e−µ2)(1 − e−µ1) = ˆ π, (35)
for some endogenous proﬁt ˆ π. Consider ˆ π as a free parameter. For a given ˆ π (34) and (35) uniquely
determine the measure ˆ v1 and ˆ v2 of ﬁrms in the low and high group. That is, ˆ π is supported by a
unique measure ˆ v = ˆ v1 + ˆ v2 of ﬁrms. We want to show that there is only a single ˆ π that is supported
by ˆ v = v, which then establishes uniqueness v1 and v2 (and thus of F as in part 2). By (34) µ1 strictly
increases in ˆ π. Equal proﬁts at high and low wage ﬁrms implies
1 − e−µ2 − µ2e−µ2 = 1 − µ1e−µ1/(1 − e−µ1), (36)
which implies that µ2 is strictly increasing in ˆ π, since µ1e−µ1/(1 − e−µ1) is strictly decreasing in µ1.
Since µ2 = γ2/ˆ v2, ˆ v2 is strictly decreasing in ˆ π. We have proven the lemma if we can show that
also ˆ v1 + ˆ v2 is decreasing in ˆ π. Since µ1 = (γ1 + γ2 − γ2p2)/ˆ v1 we get dµ1/dˆ π = −[µ1/ˆ v1][dˆ v1/dˆ π] −
(1/ˆ v1)(1 − e−µ2 − µ2e−µ2)[dˆ v2/dˆ π]. By the prior argument this derivative has to be strictly positive,
which together with µ1 > 1−e−µ2−µ2e−µ2 implies dˆ v1/dˆ π+dˆ v2/dˆ π < 0. µ1 > 1−e−µ2−µ2e−µ2 holds
because it is by (36) equivalent to µ1 > 1−µ1e−µ1/(1−e−µ1), which is equivalent to 1 > (1−e−µ1)/µ1.
The latter is true for all µ1 > 0. Since for ˆ π → 0 we have ˆ v → ∞ and for ˆ π → 1 we have ˆ v → 0, there
is exactly one ˆ π supported by a measure ˆ v = v of ﬁrms. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
We ﬁrst show that an equilibrium without entry exists if c1 > u∗
1, while it does not exist if c1 < u∗
1.
Consider some (candidate) equilibrium without entry, i.e. v = 0, sustained by some function µ(.)
for the eﬀective queue length. Then by equilibrium conditions 2a) and 2b) the conjecture about the
queue that would prevail under entry cannot be so low that workers would like to send applications.
In particular, it has to hold that
1 − e1−µ(w)
µ(w)
w ≤ c1 (37)
for all w ∈ [0,1], and (37) has to hold with equality for all µ(w) > 0 by the Market Utility As-
32sumption.26 Substitution into the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function and taking ﬁrst order conditions implies
that the highest proﬁt for an entering ﬁrm is at wage w0 such that e−µ(w0) = c1, yielding proﬁts
π(w0) = 1 − e−µ(w0) − µ(w0)e−µ(w0). Note that c1 < u∗
1 implies e−µ(w0) < e−µ∗
1 or µ(w0) > µ∗
1, while
c1 > u∗
1 conversely implies µ(w0) < µ∗
1.
In case 1 we have c1 > u∗




where the inequality follows since 1−e−µ −µe−µ is increasing in µ on R+. Therefore, v = 0 does not
violate equilibrium condition 1b). Since positive entry would result in marginal beneﬁts u∗
1 < c1 that
would not sustain any application behavior, there cannot be any equilibria with entry.
In cases 2 and 3 we have c1 < u∗
1 and thus π(w0) = 1 − e−µ0
− µ0e−µ0




Therefore v = 0 cannot be an equilibrium as a ﬁrm that would enter would make strictly positive
proﬁts, violating equilibrium condition 1b). Therefore, assume an equilibrium with with v > 0 exists
(as we will show in the following). Since u∗
1 is the marginal utility at the low wage under ﬁrms free
entry condition, all workers will apply at least once since u∗
1 > c1. The question is whether also a high
wage will be oﬀered. Let’s assume only one wage is oﬀered and workers only send one application.
Workers do not want to deviate if it is not proﬁtable to send another application to the oﬀered wage
(because at other wages the queue length is determined by their indiﬀerence by the Market Utility





is stronger than c2 < u∗
2 − u∗
1. So in case 1 equilibrium conditions 2a) and 2b) will be fulﬁlled, and
even for some parameters in case 2 workers would not start sending additional applications even if all
ﬁrms oﬀered only one wage.





despite the fact that this candidate wage is determined by their ﬁrst order condition. At high (not
oﬀered) wages the queue length might increase fast because workers would send their high application
if these high wages were oﬀered, which happens in region [ ¯ w,1] according Proposition 1. Since by
construction the wage w∗
1 is optimal on [u1, ¯ w], a ﬁrm that is looking for a proﬁtable deviation has
to ﬁnd the optimal wage in the interior of [ ¯ w,1]. Since u2 = c2 + u1 according to Proposition 1, we
have by (17) the proﬁt π(µ) = (1 − e−µ)(1 − e−µ∗
1) − µc2 for a deviant that oﬀers a wage in ( ¯ w,1). If
there is a proﬁtable deviation, it must be proﬁtable to deviate to ˆ µ given by the ﬁrst order condition
e−ˆ µ(1 − e−µ∗
1) = c2, which implies ˆ µ < µ∗
2 in case 2 and ˆ µ > µ∗
2 in case 3. Substitution leads to an
optimal deviation proﬁt of
π(ˆ µ) = (1 − e−ˆ µ − ˆ µe−ˆ µ)(1 − e−µ∗
1). (38)
Comparing (38) with (26) establishes that π(ˆ µ) is strictly smaller than K in case 2, making a deviation
unproﬁtable, and strictly larger than K in case 3, yielding a strictly proﬁtable deviation (the wage
associated with ˆ µ is indeed above ¯ w in case 3). Therefore an equilibrium with one wage exists in case
2 [and entry is such that v = 1/µ∗
1], and not in case 3.
Finally, it is immediate that in case 2 an equilibrium with two wages cannot exist because
by u∗
2 − u∗
1 < c2 the marginal utility of the second application is too low, while an equilibrium
with two wages exists in case 3 since u∗
2 − u∗
1 > c2 [with entry v = v1 + v2, v2 = 1/µ∗
2 and
v1 = (1 − (1 − e−µ∗
2)/µ∗
2)/µ∗
1]. Therefore in case 2 everyone sends one application to the unique
wage, while in case 3 every worker sends two applications, one to each of the two wages. Uniqueness
is then ensured by Lemma 2. Q.E.D.
26This captures the idea of subgame perfection similar to the Market Utility Assumption: workers are indif-
ferent between applying to the deviant that entered and not applying at all, which is the prerequisite for having
some workers apply while other do not.
33Proof of Proposition 6:
For γ0 = 1 or v = 0, the result is trivial since matches are always zero. When workers send
one application (γ2 = 0), one group of ﬁrms with equal hiring probability as in the decentralized
equilibrium is indeed optimal because of strict concavity of the ﬁrms’ matching probability 1 − e−λ.
This is proven, e.g., in Shimer (2005).
For γ2 > 0, we ﬁrst note that for any {F,G} ∈ ΦW
1 × ΦW
1 × ΦW
2 on W = {w1,w2,...,wM}
the eﬀective queue length µ(wi) and its components λ(wi) and 1 − ψ(wi) are uniquely deﬁned by
equations (4) to (8) at all wages that are oﬀered.27 We prove the result using a variational argument.
Let {F,G} ∈ ΦW
1 × ΦW
1 × ΦW
2 be some possibly optimal wage setting and application behavior on
W = {w1,w2,...,wM} with 0 < wi < wi+1 < 1, and deﬁne w0 = 0 for notational convenience.28 We
will show that we can ﬁnd a two-group eﬃcient matching (with two wages) that weakly improves
on {F,G}. The proof is structured into two steps. First, we show that for each wage in W we can
decompose the application process such that some ﬁrms only receive high and others only receive low
applications without changing the overall matches in the economy. In the second part of the argument
we apply the decomposition from step 1 successively to all wages and rearrange wages. This leaves
us with some ﬁrms at high wages that only receive the high application of any worker who sends two
applications, and some ﬁrms at low wages that only receive the low (or single) application of every
worker. We then show that it weakly improves the matching if workers send the applications that go to
low wage ﬁrms randomly, and send the applications that go to high wage ﬁrms randomly. Therefore,
we only need one high and one low wage to generate the optimal matching, and two-group-eﬃciency
is indeed the best possible outcome.
Step 1: Restrict W to consist only of those wages w that are oﬀered by ﬁrms, i.e. w ∈ F, and to
which some workers apply, i.e. w ∈ suppG1 ∪ suppG2
1 ∪ suppG2
2. All other wages do not contribute
to the matching in the market and can be removed from W. This immediately implies that at each
remaining wage w ∈ W we have λ(w) ∈ (0,∞). {F,G} can be completely described by the measure
f(wi) of ﬁrms oﬀering wage wi, the measure g1(wi) of workers that send a single application and
send it to wi and the measure g2(wi,wj) of workers that apply to the combination of wages (wi,wj),
i ≤ j.29 By construction g2(wi,wj) = 0 if i > j. The measure of workers that send two applications
and send their low application to wi is then given by the marginal g2
1(wi) =
P
j g(wi,wj), while the




Consider some wage wi ∈ W that receives both high as well as low (or single) applications by
agents, i.e. g2
2(wi) > 0 and either g2




gross queue of high applications to ﬁrms at wi, excluding the applications from agents that sent both
applications to the same wage. Let λl(wi) =
g1(wi)+g2
1(wi)−g(wi,wi)
f(wi) be the gross queue of low or single
27λ(wi) is simply the measure of applications sent to wi divided by the measure of ﬁrms oﬀering this wage.
ψ(wi) is determined as a ﬁxed point to (8) since p(wi) = (1 − e−µ(wi))/µ(wi) and µ(wi) = (1 − ψ(wi))λ(wi).
Since
R 1
˜ w>wi p( ˜ w)d ˆ G( ˜ w|w) =: A is exclusively determined at higher wages and ˆ q(wi|wi) =: B is determined by
G, both independent of ψ(wi), we have a ﬁxed point ψ(wi) = A+(B/2)(1−e−(1−ψ(wi))λ(wi))/[(1−ψ(wi))λ(wi)].
The left hand side is linear in ψ(wi), the right hand side strictly convex in ψ(wi), which can be used to show
existence of a unique ﬁxed point. The system can be solved recursively starting at the highest wage.
28Strict inequalities at the boundaries does not restrict optimality, as the only purpose of the wages is to
determine the rank in the matching, and it facilitates the speciﬁcation of a larger grid in the later exposition.
29That is, f(wi) = v(F(wi) − F(wi−1)), g1(wi) = γ1(G1(wi) − G1(wi−1)) and g2(wi,wj) = γ2[G2(wi,wj) −
G2(wi−1,wj) − G2(wi,wj−1) + G2(wi−1,wj−1)].
34applications to ﬁrms at wi, again excluding agents that sent both applications to the same wage.
Let λm(wi) = g(wi,wi)/f(wi) be the ratio of workers that send both applications to wi to ﬁrms
oﬀering that wage. Each of these latter workers sends two applications to this wage, and therefore
λ(wi) = λh(wi) + λl(wi) + 2λm(wi). Let ¯ ψi be the average probability that someone who applied to
wi and to a strictly higher wage obtains an oﬀer at the high wage.
We want to show that we can achieve the same number of matches by introducing an additional
wage wL
i ∈ (wi,wi−1) and have all high wage applications still be sent to wi while all low (or single)
applications are now sent to wL
i , while neither changing the application behavior nor the measure
of ﬁrms at higher or lower wages. That is, we assign new strategies F0 and G0 on W ∪ {wL
i } with
associated f0 and g0.30 Only the measure of ﬁrms at wi and wL
i is not determined by this speciﬁcation,
i.e. we are free to choose f0(wi) and f0(wL
i ) as long as they add to the original measure f(wi).
We ﬁrst notice that the eﬀective queue length µ0(wj) under the new strategies coincides with µ(wj)
for all wj > wi, as we did not change the application behavior at higher wages and the matching rates
at higher wages are not inﬂuenced by changes at lower wages. Therefore, the average probability that
somebody who sends his application to wL
i and to a wage strictly above wi gets the high wage oﬀer
remains ¯ ψi. Next, we observe that we can ﬁnd assign measure f0(wi) and f0(wL
i ) adding to f(wi)
such that µ0(wi) = µ0(wL
i ), i.e. the eﬀective queue length at both wages is equalized. Let µh(ρ) and
µh(ρ) denote the eﬀective queue length at wi and wL
i , respectively, given that a fraction ρ of the f(wi)
ﬁrms oﬀers the higher of the two wages. µh(ρ) =
λh(wi)+λm(wi)
ρ , because all applications are eﬀective.





1−ρ . For ρ close to zero
µh(ρ) > µl(ρ), while for ρ close to 1 µh(ρ) < µl(ρ). By the intermediate value theorem it is possible
to equalize both at some ρ0 ∈ (0,1). Let f0(wi) = ρ0f(wi) and f0(wL
i ) = (1 − ρ)f(wi).
Note that the eﬀective queue length µ0(wi) under the new strategies is identical to µ(wi) under
the original strategies. Assume not, e.g. µ0(wi) = µ0(wL
i ) > µ(wi). That means that under µ0 strictly
more of the measure f(wi) of ﬁrms get matched then under µ at wages wi and wL
i . On the other hand
it becomes strictly harder for workers to get an oﬀer, and since we did not change the application
behavior at other wages, strictly less workers get matched at these wages. Since workers and ﬁrms are
matched in pairs, we cannot obtain more matches for ﬁrms than for workers. Similarly µ0(wi) < µ(wi)
can be ruled out. Therefore, µ0(wi) = µ(wL
i ) = µ(wi) and we have not changed the overall matching
probabilities at any of the wages, because ﬁrms at wages below wL
i face exactly the same probabilities
that their workers take other jobs than under the original strategy.
Step 2: Repeating step 1 successively for each wi ∈ W leaves us with a set of low application wages
{wL
1 ,...,wL
M} and a set of high application wages {w1,...,wM} with eﬀective queue lengths µ0(wi) =
µ0(wL
i ) = µ(wi) and measures of ﬁrms f0(wi)+f0(wL
i ) = f(wi), and since the ﬁrms still face the same
eﬀective queue length we have an unchanged number of matches in the economy. Now we can rearrange
the wages such that any wL
i wage is below any wj wage without changing the number of matches,
since any pair of wages (wL
i ,wj) with g0(wL
i ,wj) > 0 already has by construction wj > wL
i . That is,
we can use a new set of wages ˇ W = { ˇ w1,..., ˇ w2M} such that 0 < ˇ w1 < ... < ˇ w2M < 1, a mapping
κ that assigns κ( ˇ wi) = wL
i if i ≤ M and κ( ˇ wi) = wi−M if i ≥ M, and strategies ˇ f( ˇ wi) = f0(κ( ˇ wi)),
ˇ g1( ˇ wi) = g10(κ( ˇ wi)) and ˇ g1( ˇ wi, ˇ wj) = g10(κ( ˇ wi),κ( ˇ wj)) that leave the overall matching unchanged.
The next step is to show that it is suﬃcient to have only one low wage and one high wage. We say
that we “collapse” two wages ˇ w and ˇ w0 into one if we assign new strategies ˜ f and ˜ g that are identical
30f0(w) = f(w) and g10(w) = g1(w) for all w ∈ W/{wi}, g20(wa,wb) = g2(wa,wb) for all (wa,wb) ∈
(W/{wi})2, g10(wL
i ) = g1(wi) and g10(wi) = 0, g20(wL
i ,wb) = g2(wi,wb) for wb ∈ W/{wi}, g20(wa,wi) =
g2(wa,wi) for wa ∈ W/{wi}, g20(wL
i ,wi) = g2(wi,wi), and g20(wa,wb) = 0 for all other (wa,wb) ∈ W02.
35to the strategies ˇ f and ˇ g except that all ﬁrms that oﬀered ˇ w0 now also oﬀer ˇ w and all applications
that were sent to ˇ w0 are now sent to ˇ w.31 We will show that by collapsing all low wages and collapsing
all high wages we weakly improve the number of matches.
Consider ﬁrst two low wages ˇ w and ˇ w0 in { ˇ w1,..., ˇ wM}, i.e. wages at which ﬁrms only receive low
(or single) applications. At the former the matching probability for a ﬁrm is given by 1 − e−(1−ψ)λ
for the appropriate average ψ and average gross queue length λ under ˜ f and ˜ g, while the matching
probability is 1 − e−(1−ψ0)λ0
at the latter. We show that in an optimal allocation ﬁrms at either wage
have the same queue length by shifting ﬁrms from one group to the other while leaving the applications
that each group receives the same. That is, we retain ˜ f and ˜ g, except for ˜ f( ˇ w) and ˜ f( ˇ w0) for which
we retain the overall measure ν = ˜ f( ˇ w) + ˜ f( ˇ w0) but assign a fraction ρ to ˇ w and the remainder to ˇ w0
so as to get to optimal number of matches. Let γ and γ0 denote the gross measure of applications at
ˇ w and ˇ w0. We consider ν,γ,γ0 strictly positive, as otherwise at least one wage does not contribute to
the number of matches and can be dropped form the analysis. Then the number of matches across








Since both subgroups have a strictly positive measures of applications, it cannot be optimal to place
all ﬁrms in only one subgroup (as otherwise few ﬁrms placed in the other would be matched nearly
for certain). Therefore, to achieve optimal matching ρ is characterized by the ﬁrst order condition
ν[(1 − e−µ) − (1 − e−µ0
) − µe−µ + µ0e−µ0
] = 0, (40)
where µ = (1 − ψ)
γ
νρ and µ0 = (1 − ψ0)
γ0
ν(1−ρ). Since 1 − e−µ − µe−µ is strictly increasing in µ (and
similar for µ0), we have µ = µ0 in the optimal allocation of ﬁrms. That means that in the optimal
allocation both groups have the same hiring probability, and by collapsing the two wages they remain
to have the same hiring probabilities (which is identical to the case prior to the collapsing as otherwise
one would match a diﬀerent measure of ﬁrms than workers – as outlined in the last paragraph of step
1). Therefore the overall matching is unchanged. Repeating this argument, we can collapse all wages
in { ˇ w1,..., ˇ wM} to a single wage.
By this construction, for low and single application ﬁrms only the average matching probability at
high application ﬁrms matters. If we keep the measure of low and single application ﬁrms constant and
leave the gross queue length for them unchanged, but match more workers already at high wage ﬁrms,
this clearly improves the matching (despite some negative externality on the low or single application
ﬁrms). Therefore, we consider next the set of high application wages { ˇ wM+1,...., ˇ w2M} and maximize
the number of matches there. At high wages the gross and the eﬀective queue length coincide. By
the strict concavity of 1 − e−λ the average matching probability at high wage ﬁrms is maximized if
the gross queue length (and thus the eﬀective queue length) is identical for all of them. This result is
well known, see e.g. Shimer (2005). Since the queue length at all high length ﬁrms is identical in the
optimal matching, we can collapse them successively to a single wage without changing the number
of matches in the economy.
31That is, ˜ f and ˜ g coincide at all wage (combinations) with ˇ f and ˇ g that do not involve ˇ w or ˇ w0 and have
˜ f( ˇ w) = ˇ f( ˇ w)+ ˇ f( ˇ w0), ˜ f( ˇ w0) = 0, ˜ g1( ˇ w) = ˇ g1( ˇ w)+ˇ g1( ˇ w0), ˜ g1( ˇ w0) = 0, ˜ g2( ˇ w, ˇ w) = ˇ g2( ˇ w, ˇ w)+ˇ g2( ˇ w, ˇ w0)+ˇ g2( ˇ w0, ˇ w),
˜ g2( ˇ w, ˇ wb) = ˇ g2( ˇ w, ˇ wb) + ˇ g2( ˇ w0, ˇ wb) when ˇ wb / ∈ { ˇ w, ˇ w0}, and ˜ g2( ˇ wa, ˇ w) = ˇ g2( ˇ wa, ˇ w) + ˇ g2( ˇ wa, ˇ w0) when ˇ wa / ∈
{ ˇ w, ˇ w0}.
36This leaves us with two wages, one that attracts only low (and single) applications and one that
attracts only high applications, and we have either not changed the number of matches compared
to those arising from {F,G} or we have improved upon them. Our analysis of two-group eﬃciency
revealed that the equilibrium achieves the highest number of matches in this two-wage environment,
which means that the equilibrium weakly improves upon {F,G}. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7:
Given v and γ with γ2 > 0, consider two tuples {F0,G0} and {F00,G00} that lead to equal hiring
probabilities η0 respectively η00 for all ﬁrms. Similar to the argument in the proof of Proposition
6 η0 = η00, since otherwise one tuple would match more workers but fewer ﬁrms than the other.
Therefore, all strategies that have identical matching probabilities for all ﬁrms achieve the same
measure of matches vη0.
Assume we have a grid W at our disposal that has at least two elements w1 and w2 > w1. We
use a strategy that assigns some ﬁrms to w1 and all others to w2, and all workers send their high
application to the second and their low or single application to the ﬁrst wage. Let ρ be the frac-
tion of ﬁrms at the high wage. We have µ2 = λ2 = γ2/(vρ) and µ1 = [1 − γ2p2/(γ1 + γ2)]λ1 =
[γ1 + γ2 − γ2(1 − e−λ2)/λ2]/(v(1 − ρ)). Since for ρ ≈ 0 clearly µ2 > µ1 and for ρ ≈ 1 µ2 < µ1, there
exists a ˆ ρ such that eﬀective queue length and thus the hiring probability of both groups is equalized.
It is easy to show that µ1 − µ2 is strictly increasing in ρ around µ2 ≈ µ1, so that ˆ ρ is unique. This
two-group process has µ1 = µ2, but the optimal two group process fulﬁlls (29), which requires µ1 < µ2,
i.e. a strictly smaller fraction of ﬁrms at the high wage compared to the assignment that equalizes
matching probabilities at both wages. Q.E.D.
Extended Setup for Section 5:
We generalize the setting to the case where workers can send any number i ∈ N0 of applications,
at a cost c(i). We have c(0) = 0, increasing marginal costs ci = c(i) − c(i − 1), and largest integer N
such that c(N) ≤ 1. Since many arguments are straightforward generalizations of that special case,
we focus mainly on the changes that are necessary to adapt the prior setup.
The extension requires mainly adaptations of the workers’ setup, while it remains essentially
unchanged for ﬁrms. The workers’ strategy is now a tuple (γ,G), where γ = (γ0,γ1,...,γN) ∈ 4N
and G = (G1,G2,...,GN) ∈ ×N
i=1Φi, where 4N is the N-dimensional unit simplex and Φi the set of
cumulative distribution functions of [0,1]i. γi denotes the probability of sending i applications, and
Gi denotes the cumulative distribution function over [0,1]i that describes the application behavior.
Let (w1,...,wi) satisfy w1 ≤ w2 ≤ ... ≤ wi and let Gi
j denote the marginal distribution of Gi over wj.








p(wj)wj − c(i). (30)













λ( ˜ w) dF( ˜ w). (70)
To specify ψ(w) in the extended setup, consider a ﬁrm at wage w that receives an application and let
37ˆ G(˜ w|w) denote probability that the sender applied with his other N −1 applications to wages weakly
below ˜ w. If the sender only sent i < N − 1 other applications, then we code (only for this deﬁnition)
the additional N −1−i applications as going to wage −1. So ˜ w = ( ˜ w1,..., ˜ wN−1) ∈ ([0,1]∪{−1})N−1.
Let h(˜ w|w) count the number of applications sent to wage w when the worker applies to ˜ w and w.








[1 − p( ˜ wj)]

d ˆ G(˜ w|w). (80)
The product
Q
˜ wj>w[1 − p( ˜ wj)] describes the probability that the applicant does not take a job at
a strictly better wage. Its multiplier gives the probability that a worker does not turn down a job
oﬀer because of a job at another ﬁrm with the same wage, conditional on failing at higher wages (see
e.g. Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001), equation (6)). Then the integrand gives the probability that the
worker takes the job at a diﬀerent ﬁrm.
The deﬁnitions for all other variables, i.e. µ, p and η and π remain unchanged. With these ad-
justments the equilibrium deﬁnition extends to this section.
Proof of Proposition 10:
Consider some (candidate) equilibrium with some γ that we ﬁx for the moment. Denote by ˆ i the
highest integer for which γi > 0. By straightforward generalization of Proposition 1 we have
p(w) = 1 ∀w ∈ [0, ¯ w0], and (41)
p(w)w + (1 − p(w))ui−1 = ui ∀w ∈ [ ¯ wi−1, ¯ wi] ∀i ∈ {1,...,N}, (42)
where ui ≡ maxw∈[0,1] p(w)w + (1 − p(w))ui−1 for all i ∈ {1,2,...ˆ i}, u0 ≡ 0, ¯ w0 = u1. The Market
Utility Assumption implies that workers cannot receive more than the Market Utility, which implies
that ui − ui−1 = ci for i > ˆ i. Indiﬀerence then yields ¯ wi = ui−1 + [ui − ui−1]2/(ui − ui−1 − ci+1). If
this is in [0,1] then this gives the appropriate boundary, otherwise [ ¯ wi, ¯ wi+1] is empty.
Using (42), we can rewrite the proﬁt function for a ﬁrm who oﬀers a wage w ∈ [ ¯ wi−1, ¯ wi] with
¯ wi−1 < 1 as
π(µ) = (1 − e−µ)(1 − ui−1) − µ(ui − ui−1), (43)
where µ = µ(w). The logic is similar to (17). If ¯ wi−1 = 1 the proﬁt is trivially zero. Proposition 2,
stating that there exists no equilibrium in which only one wage is oﬀered, can now easily be shown
with similar techniques whenever γi > 0 for some i > 1. By a similar argument it is straightforward
that at least i wages have to be oﬀered in equilibrium whenever γi > 0. Given that (43) is strictly
concave, it is also immediate that all ﬁrms within the same interval oﬀer the same wage, yielding
exactly ˆ i wages when some workers send ˆ i applications.
We call the group of ﬁrms that ends up oﬀering the i’th highest wage as group i and index all
their variables accordingly. It is convenient to denote by Γi =
Pˆ i
k=i γk the fraction of workers who






k=i+1(1 − pk)], since a fraction γj/Γi of applicants sends j applications and does not get
a better job with probability
Qj
k=i+1(1 − pk). The eﬀective queue length at wage i is given by
µi = (1 − ψi)λi, where λi = Γi/vi is the gross queue length. For i < ˆ i the unique oﬀered wage in
38[ ¯ wi−1, ¯ wi] is obtained by the ﬁrst-order-conditions of (43), which are given by
ui − ui−1 = e−µi(1 − ui−1). (44)
Therefore (43) can be rewritten as
πi = (1 − e−µi − µie−µi)(1 − ui−1). (45)
Free entry implies that πi = K, which together with (44) implies that µi = µ∗
i and ui = u∗
i as deﬁned
in the main body. By a similar argument as for (25) and (26) the condition πi = K deﬁnes for a given
vector γ of applications the unique measure vi of ﬁrms in each group. Existence and – except for the
case where ci∗ = u∗
i − u∗
i−1 – uniqueness follow by similar arguments as in the case of at most two
applications.
To show constrained eﬃciency, we ﬁrst consider search eﬃciency for given γ and v. Let ˆ i still denote
the maximum number of applications that workers send. We ﬁrst consider a planner that only uses ˆ i
wages and, thus, ˆ i groups of ﬁrms, with ρiv ﬁrms in each groups. That is, a worker who applies to i
ﬁrms applies once to each of the lowest i wages and accepts an oﬀer from a higher wage ﬁrm over an
oﬀer from a lower wage ﬁrm. We call an allocation of ﬁrms across groups that leads to the maximum
number of matches ˆ i-group-eﬃcient. Compare two adjacent groups of ﬁrms i and i − 1 with total
measure ν = vi + vi−1. We show that the only eﬃcient way of dividing this measure up between the




M(ρ) = νρ(1 − e−µi) + ν(1 − ρ)(1 − e−µi−1). (46)
It can be shown that a boundary solution cannot be optimal, as it means that one application is
waisted. Noting that (1 − ψi−1) = γi−1/Γi−1 + (1 − ψi)(1 − pi)Γi/Γi−1 we can write µi = (1 − ψi)λi





= 1 − e−µi − (1 − e−µi−1) + e−µiρ(1 − ψi)
dλi
dρ













We can use similar substitutions as for (29), with the adjustment that now dµi/dρ = −µi/ρ =
−νµ2
i/[(1 − ψi)Γi], to show that the last term in the ﬁrst line equals −µie−µi, and the second line
reduces to e−µi−1[µi−1 − (1 − e−µi − µie−µi]. Therefore we obtain the following ﬁrst order condition
dM(ρ)
νdρ
= (1 − e−µi − µie−µi)(1 − e−µi−1) − (1 − e−µi−1 − µi−1e−µi−1) = 0. (47)
For given ν this uniquely characterizes the optimal interior ρ, since similar substitutions as above yield
d2M/dρ2 = −ν[µ2
2e−µ2(1−e−µ1)/ρ+e−µ1(1−e−µ2−µ2e−µ2−µ1)2/(1−ρ)] < 0. A similar construction
as in the proof of Proposition 6 shows that ˆ i groups are suﬃcient to achieve the constrained optimal
outcome.
Next, we establish that the overall entry of ﬁrms and the measure of ﬁrms in each group under
39equilibrium conditions 1a), 1b), 2a) and 3) yields optimal entry and optimal application decisions
simultaneously, taking γ as given. Let ρ(v) = (ρ1(v),ρ2(v),..,ρˆ i(v)) be the fraction of ﬁrms in each
of the ˆ i groups under constrained optimal search given v and γ. Again let M∗(γ,v,ρ(v)) denote the
constrained eﬃcient number of matches given v and γ. Similar to (30) the objective function is given
by maxv≥0 M∗(γ,v,ρ(v)) − vK. When ˆ i > 0, then K < 1 ensures that the optimal solution is in
the interior of [0,V ]. We show that the ﬁrst order condition uniquely determines the solution and
corresponds to the free entry condition.
By the envelope theorem the impact of a change of the fraction ρi(v) of ﬁrms in each group on
the measure of matches can be neglected, i.e. dM∗
dρi
dρi
dv = 0 at the ˆ i-group-eﬃcient ρi. We get as ﬁrst
order condition
dM∗(γ,v,ρ)/dv = K, (48)


































where the equality line is obtained by rearranging the terms for each dpi/dv. To simplify notation,










(1 − pk)]. (50)
Since pˆ i = (1 − e−µˆ i)/µˆ i we have dpˆ i/dv = −(1/µ2
ˆ i)(1 − e−µˆ i − µˆ ie−µˆ i)(dµˆ i/dv). Since µˆ i = γˆ i/(ρˆ iv),
we have dµˆ i/dv = −γˆ i/(ρˆ iv2) = −ρˆ iµˆ i/γˆ i. So we get dpˆ i/dv = −ρˆ i(1−e−µˆ i −µˆ ie−µˆ i)/γˆ i. Noting that
Γˆ i(1 − ψˆ i) = γˆ i, we have established that
ξˆ i = ρˆ i(1 − e−µˆ i − µˆ ie−µˆ i)
Y
k<ˆ i
(1 − pk). (51)
By induction we can establish the following lemma, which we prove subsequently because it would
distract from the argument at this point.




ρk)(1 − e−µi − µie−µi)
Y
j<i
(1 − pk). (52)
This implies that ξ1 = 1 − eµ1 − µ1e−µ1. The ﬁrst order condition ξ1 = K uniquely deﬁnes µ1, and
corresponds to the free entry condition of the lowest wage ﬁrms. By (47) it also determines µi uniquely
for all i ∈ 2,...,ˆ i, which in turn determines vi uniquely for all i ∈ 1,...,ˆ i. Thus equilibrium entry and
search is constrained optimal given γ.
Finally, when we endogenize γ, again note that the number of applications of other workers in
40equilibrium is not important for the marginal beneﬁts of each individual worker, which are always
u∗
i − u∗
i−1. Therefore again the decision on the number of applications is constrained eﬃcient, estab-
lishing constrained eﬃciency overall. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma A1:




ρk)(1 − e−µi+1 − µi+1e−µi+1)
Y
k<i+1
(1 − pk). (53)
It clearly holds for i =ˆ i − 1 by (51). Now assume it holds for some i. We consider ξi. We know that





(1 − pk). (54)





(1 − pk) = −
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µi(1 − e−µi − µie−µi) = pi − e−µi, we can substitute the prior equation into (55) and






(1 − pk) =
pi − e−µi
1 − pi









ρk)(1 − e−µi − µie−µi)
Y
k<i
(1 − pk). (56)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 11:
First we show that for i∗ → ∞ the (weakly) shorter side of the market gets matched with prob-
ability approaching 1. Since equilibrium search is always more eﬃcient than a process of random
applications and acceptances (as would happen if all ﬁrms oﬀered the same wage), we show this for
the latter. As i∗ → ∞ it cannot happen that workers and ﬁrms both are matched with probabilities
bounded away from one. If that were the case, than some fraction α > 0 of ﬁrms would always remain
unmatched. But then the chance that a worker applies to such a ﬁrm with any given application is α,
41so that the probability that he applies to such a ﬁrm with at least one of his applications converges
to 1, yielding a contradiction. With unequal sizes it is obviously the shorter side whose probability
of being matched converges to one; with equal sizes the probability of being matched is the same and
agents from both sides get matched with probability converging to one.
For the next arguments, recall that the marginal utility gain (excluding the marginal application
cost) of the i∗’th application, given by u∗
i∗ − u∗
i∗−1, converges to zero as i∗ → ∞. We will use this
to establish the limit for the average wage if ﬁrms are either on the long or on the short side of the
market.
Case 1: We show that w(i∗) → 0 if ﬁrms are strictly on the short side of the market. Assume there
exists a subsequence of i∗’s such that v(i∗) < 1− for all i∗ and some  > 0. That implies σ(i∗) < α for
some α < 1. If w(i∗) 9 0, then there exists a subsequence such that w(i∗) → ω > 0 and π(i∗) → 1−ω
(since η(i∗) → 1). Now consider a deviant ﬁrm that always oﬀers wage w0 = ω/2. As workers send
more applications, the hiring probability for the deviant has to converge to 1. This is due to the fact
that for workers the marginal utility of sending the last application converges to zero, which implies
that the probability of getting the job at the deviant ﬁrm has to become negligible as otherwise each
worker would like to send his last application there to insure against the 1−α probability of not being
hired. With the hiring probability approaching 1 the proﬁt of the deviant converges to 1 − ω/2, i.e.
the deviation is proﬁtable. Thus it has hold that w(i∗) → 0.
Case 2: We show that w(i∗) → 1 if ﬁrms are strictly on the long side of the market. Assume there
exists a subsequence of i∗’s such that v(i∗) > 1 +  for all i∗ and some  > 0. In this case η(i∗) < α
for some α < 1 and all i∗. If w(i∗) 9 1, then there exists a subsequence such that w(i∗) → ω < 1 and
π(i∗) → π < α(1−ω). Consider a ﬁrm that always oﬀers wage w0 ∈ (ω,1) such that 1−w0 > α(1−ω).
Again the hiring probability of the deviant converges to 1, because if there were a non-negligible
chance of getting the job at w0 worker’s would rather send there last application to this higher than
average wage. But then the deviant’s proﬁt converges to 1 − w0 and the deviation is proﬁtable. So
w(i∗) → 1.
This immediately implies that v(i∗) → 1. Otherwise a subsequence of i∗’s according either to case
1 or to case 2 has to exist, but in case 1 proﬁts are above entry costs and in case 2 they are below
entry costs, violating the free entry condition. Finally, since v(i∗) → 1 and ﬁrms get matched with
probability close to one, π = K implies that the average paid wage w(i∗) has to converge to 1 − K.
This directly implies that u∗
i∗ → 1 − K.
To show that the individual search costs converges to zero, i.e. that also U∗(i∗) = u∗
i∗ − ci∗
(i∗) →
















i ] for some I ≤ i∗, where ci∗
i = ci∗
(i) − ci∗
(i − 1) again denotes marginal cost. For a given i
the diﬀerence u∗
i − u∗
i−1 is simply a number independent of i∗ (and the associated cost function). It
converges to zero for large i, which entails that u∗
i∗ −u∗
i∗−1 →i∗→∞ 0. Due to increasing marginal costs




i∗−1 for all i ≤ i∗, which which
together with u∗
i∗ − u∗
i∗−1 →i∗→∞ 0 only restates that that we consider changing cost functions with
ci∗









i−1] for any ﬁxed

































i−1] = limi∗→∞ u∗
i∗ = 1 − K. Q.E.D.
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